In this paper I have examined the roots of an autevolutionary worldview by drawing inferences from currently phenomenalistic concepts of Gaia, outlining epistemological arguments, and making interdisciplinary comparisons. Whether or not this view will prove to be fruitful (one of the epistemological criteria for worldviews), is yet to be determined. However, toward this end, some reasonable avenues for development seem to exist. Some conclusions from this investigation are:
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The circle of ideas identified in the Chapman conference as "strong Gaia" are best treated in the context of a new worldview, as they do not fit epistemologically as an hypothesis ("the Gaia hypothesis") within current ecological and evolutionary worldviews. A non-deterministic quantum physical worldview, suggested by Bohr, Wheeler, Schroedinger, and others, following closely the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum phenomena, provides a suitable model to support formulation of self-definition as a central theme in systems organization. This worldview is scientific, according to precise criteria described here, and it is in current practice, although not as yet formally applied to biological disciplines. Furthermore, evidence now exists that the defining phenomenon for this worldview, observership, can be exhibited within macroscopic systems and probably exists in at least some biological structures. If these propositions are confirmed, it implies that observership can be and has been acted on by natural selection, perhaps offering a reasonable explanation for evolution of various forms of self experience. These ideas are offered to support adoption of a worldview where life is a fundamentally creative process that can affect its own evolution. It is proposed that this view be called autevolution.
The final test of a worldview is its ability to spawn fruitful theory. A theory of autevolution is thus suggested in special and general form based on the principle that life is a fundamentally self-experiencing (deriving from observership), non-deterministic, and causally active process in evolution. The special case may be defined as the evolution of the self (self-experience) and the role of the self-definition in evolution of organisms and species. The general case may be defined as the extension of the special case to inter-specific interactions, to systems, and to societies.
Theory resulting from an autevolutionary view should pose no threat to science in general, or to prior theories except to purpose that those theories have limits (which any sound epistemology should expect). It is clear that autevolution would be a theoretical pursuit that must develop its own formalism and that its implications are interdisciplinary. Furthermore, any attempt to develop theory within this worldview will require epistemological synthesis. In presenting both a descriptive and normative model for epistemological synthesis in this paper, I suggest that science as a means of acquiring knowledge may be a natural process itself, and thus may be exemplified in the natural world (Roederer, 1978; Jantsch, 1980; Goldberg, 1989).
A possible causal process ("mechanism") for the special theory is proposed in terms of form-function complimentarity over evolutionary time, with the medium of inheritance of functional decisions being behavioral modification or selection of the environment, which in turn selects form, which in turn constrains function (to uncertainty limits). In the autevolution view, living organisms are not so much "struggling for survival" as they are modifying and fulfilling function, and in so doing, acquiring knowledge, which is incorporated into their structure through their effect on natural selection - a truly participatory process. Organizational tendencies may then result from self-determination and can be enhanced at the organismic level (through positive selective evolutionary feedback), eventually extending to larger systems through mutual feedbacks between organisms. An evolutionary complementarity between form and function is proposed here, which ensures that genetic determinism would have important fundamental limits. Within the uncertainty range of such indeterminism, free-will (or intention) may operate. The result of non-deterministic behavioral choice would be a feedback of information from organism to genome, mediated by modifications of the environment and life strategy (and thus selection), affecting other generations and other species. In such a process the evolution of form and the expression of function (behavior) can never perfectly correspond, and the mismatch must then modify and influence the evolution of form along pathways that are determined in part by organismic perception (of environment and self-function, or purpose). Non-random and seemingly purposeful evolutionary pathways, not solely predictable from the effect of environmental forces, would be the expected result, rather than the enigma it seems to be in current biological worldviews.
It is suggested that given this process, the basic model presented in Figure 1 for the growth of intellectual knowledge through scientific discovery, may also be applied as a model for the evolution of species, complex organisms, communities, and ecosystems, with the tendency toward punctuated phenomena being axiomatic. If organismic life can be a causative agent (i.e. source of novelty) in its own evolution, then perception of information and definition of purpose may be a determining force for evolutionary pathways, in nature as in our human practice of scientific discovery (which then may also be thought of as natural).
Theories within the Gaia framework, like other macroevolution theories, may describe processes than are not dealt with adequately in current biology and geoscience traditions. Because they attempt to be holistic in their consideration of ecological and evolutionary time, and because of the critical, causal role that observer-participancy may have in autevolution and thus in forming a strong Gaia theory, greater importance would be placed on theories of perception and psychology applied to all living forms (e.g., Abram, 1985), the role of behavior in directing evolution (Plotkin, 1988), an epistemology which allows theory formally to include fundamental (ontic) uncertainties instead of only experimental unknowns (Rohrlich, 1989), and certain kinds of teleology (George and Johnson, 1985). This would incorporate a new assumption into evolution theory by allowing novelty in ecological time to influence environmental selection, with significant implications for directionality in evolutionary pathways, coevolution, and cooperation theory at all levels (Corning, 1983; Axelrod, 1984; Odling-Smee, 1988; Lovelock, 1988).
It is implied by the opinions expressed here that we must pursue current classical views of ecology and evolution (i.e., the present norm), but not as a dogmatic limit to biological investigation. Rather it must be pursued as a useful first-order mechanical approximation to reality, which we know is more complex, with important processes extending beyond the classical realm of space and time dimensions. Quantum physical processes (observer-participancy) expressed macroscopically and magnified over time by the operation of mechanical (classical) evolutionary process, may account for the emergence of self-determination as a significant second-order factor in evolution and ecology. In this view, self-determination properties of systems (Gaia), if they are in fact organized at that level (which would require structures or coordination mechanisms for sub-structures capable of maintaining such phenomena), stem from self-determination of organismic function, which would appear objectively as indeterminism. Furthermore, these phenomena cannot be uniquely isolated to the human example, but must rather be recognized as a property of all living organisms (and perhaps all matter) expressed variably at different levels of complexity. This view might imply evolutionary tendencies toward large-scale coevolution and cooperation as a function of the degree of expression and interdependence of teleonomic indeterminism (free-will determinations of function and, by implication, purpose) originating with the phenotype. This may present intriguing possibilities for the development of interdisciplinary ecological and evolutionary models that take into account the evolutionary feedback of functional modifications and their collective effect on environmental selection (i.e., complementarity of form and function through evolutionary time). It seems possible that some of the emergent properties of living systems attributed to Gaia may be derivable from such an approach. At the very least we might suspect that the human equation, including our relationship with earth systems and our own evolution, may be an important example.
Limitations of the proposed theory may be severe, even though it seems attractive from the perspective of meeting a "creative" worldview, such as implied in concepts of Gaia. The most basic limitation is acceptance of non-determinism. This choice is forced upon us in both physics and psychology, but is ultimately metaphysical, and must be evaluated by the criteria described for worldviews. The idea that non-determinism (observership) can be magnified within macroscopic biological structures, though indicated by some current evidence, remains to be well demonstrated in the appropriate context. That this strange property is intimately associated with the existence of an experiential "self" is inferred from analogy between quantum phenomena and psychology, and a direct connection may not be provable any more than it is possible to prove by means other than analogy, except for ourselves, that people have experience. Acceptance here must be based on the lack of acceptable alternatives. However, given such a worldview that adopts the foregoing or equivalent assumptions about the origins of experience and the primitive origins of thought and psyche (not to be interpreted strictly in human terms), the application of evolutionary principles leads fairly directly to the idea of complimentarity between form and self-definition or self-defined function. This is based on the logical primacy of the thought "I am" which, when combined with uncertainty, produces the next thought "Am I?" or "I am what?," or "I am {a, b, ..., etc.}" Ability to express uncertainty and definitions in a form that can be subject to natural selection (causal link between psyche and physical expression), is axiomatic (given the relationship between observership and form), however the degree to which this process is constrained or influenced by genetic, developmental, and various other environmental factors must be determined for each case. The medium of inheritance is suggested as environmental change or selection of environmental factors by organismic behavior. The process of writing and means for reading such information from one's surroundings must be described and demonstrated, yet must involve a high degree of speculation regarding species other than our own.
These conclusions necessarily involve psychological and metaphysical theories, and perhaps also theories of logic and information. The linkage to human psychological phenomena is presumed from evolutionary arguments (i.e., present abilities evolving from primitive origins). Although arguments were given that autevolution cannot be rejected on epistemological grounds, the fruitfulness of this view depends on success of its corresponding theories. Aside from the many issues mentioned above, the task of isolating biological structures capable of exhibiting observership phenomena may perhaps be the most critical challenge in establishing a causal process. Alternative theories of innovation and self-awareness emerging from complexity may remain unconvincing in a deterministic paradigm.
Finally, one must retain perspective in evaluating the implications of self-determination in evolution. I have proposed autevolution as a useful second-order effect on the overall process of evolution. This does not invalidate the first-order effects that have previously been described as largely mechanical and deterministic at the phenotype level (i.e., the modern Darwinian synthesis), nor the amazing complexities of living organisms that are adequately attributed to primarily mechanical processes (convergent and divergent evolution due respectively to similar and dissimilar environments, kin selection, effects of randomly fortuitous genetic variations, mutations, and recombination, etc.). However, even the slightest effect from complexification (or magnification) of observer-participancy could introduce directionality in an otherwise mechanical, and neutral process. The effect need not be dominant to produce directional trends, as evolution can greatly magnify subtleties that are adaptive. The effect may (or must) presumably have begun in an infinitesimal form (e.g., at the sub-atomic level, as suggested here), and could have been subjected to selection only by those systems capable of magnifying it (suggested here and elsewhere as a property of some dissipative structures). It may thus be more difficult to imagine at the present time how evolution might not have been affected by such a process than how it would be; yet the degree of influence must be determined for each case. The existence of structures (quantum coherence exhibiting observer-participancy phenomena) necessary to allow a self-determination process to be expressed macroscopically (i.e., in living organisms) is essential to the theory, but has been demonstrated only in principle and by inference from human experience and observed similarities of behavior in other organisms. Further extension of these ideas to all life can only be based on the reasonableness and fruitfulness of the worldview, as we may never have the ability to directly share the experience of other organisms. Still, full application of this view even to the human case may have profound implications.
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Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. "Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution." Boulder: Bear Mountain
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Please address comments to: John Jay Kineman