In the preceding sections I attempted to establish both a worldview
context for autevolution (as a strong basis for Gaia), and an
epistemological framework for evaluating paradigms. In this and
the following section I consider some of the more problematic
implications and some potential conflicts with existing theory,
beginning with problems of teleology and the origin of novelty.
In the next section, I expand this discussion to develop evolutionary
aspects of autevolution.
The necessity of purpose
The view of life as a causal agent introduces a major issue in epistemology: This is the issue of teleology (i.e., purpose or goal directedness). When studying physics, it is possible to define a quantity called "observer-participancy" or "registration" (Wheeler, 1981) and to treat it as a random factor (uncertainty). Because this quantity takes on the role of decision-maker in the physical experiments, the physics itself (aside from hidden variables theories) does not have to deal with how or why decisions are made (e.g., what causes the observer to measure a quantum system, or correspondingly, what causes individual registration events?). However, in a formal theory about the decision-maker (i.e. life in autevolutionary terms) the question of purpose seems inescapable. Bohr (1958), for example, stated flatly that teleology (although perhaps not the cosmic teleology of Kant) must, because of the quantum discoveries, be a part of biology.
Formal treatments of teleology
There are recent formal treatments of teleology (George and Johnson, 1985); and while the debate continues, teleological explanations are no longer considered "automatic evidence of sloppy thinking." Specific theories are emerging on how it can be treated scientifically (e.g., in cybernetics). Mayr (1988) distinguishes between "teleomatic" processes, defined as progression toward an end state through physical processes (i.e., inevitable change in a predictable direction, such as the Hubble expansion of the universe or the second law of thermodynamics), and "teleonomic" processes, which are those that are guided by a program (defined by Mayr as coded information controlling an end-directed process). Teleonomic processes, including those adapted through natural selection, can incorporate new information to alter the outcome, but apparently not the program itself, which is the result of natural selection. Mayr excludes "cosmic" teleology, that is, a "causally effective end result," from acceptable science, stating boldly that: "Indeed, I do not know of a single modern scientist who believes in it."
Although in Mayr's words teleonomy is "perhaps the most characteristic feature of the world of living organisms," it seems to be viewed strictly as a system-dependent process, not a general principle. This allows its application in ecology and organismic biology (e.g., migration, courtship, ontogeny, and numerous other goal-directed processes) but prevents its application in evolution theory (which would generalize it to cosmic dimensions). Mayr, reflecting the traditional worldview, states: "It is illegitimate to describe evolutionary progress or trends as goal directed (teleological). Selection rewards past phenomena ... but does not plan for the future." Biologists thus generally deny any form of evolutionary "progress" that might be motivated by a goal, or imply "final cause" (Futuyma, 1979). Trends in evolution, then, must be due to either chance occurrences, (e.g., disturbance, migration, environmental change, and so forth) or teleomatic end results (e.g., adaptation, niche segregation, optimization, and others).
Teleology and survival
However, within ecology and organismic biology, organisms are treated as if they were active agents, responding to and modifying their environment during the course of their life spans, in ways that promote survival. Here, the distinction between survival as a goal (cosmic teleology) and survival as an existential (and thus teleomatic) result of natural selection is somewhat obscure; but it is nevertheless maintained by the circular argument that good survival strategies (coded in the genes of fit survivors) have been selected for but cannot include a plan or vision for an ultimate state (such as long-term survival) because a future state could not have been a selective factor in ecological time. Thus, evolution theory has been used to establish survival as the paradigm for ecology, while excluding it or anything else as an evolutionarily effective goal within organismic behavior. It follows that teleonomic behavior should only evolve to benefit survival of kin and reproductive offspring in ecological time (thus implying great importance for competition, since only the survival "programs" represented in related genes can be reinforced).
Novelty at the phenotypic level
These traditional theories of evolution have also excluded consideration of true novelty at the phenotypic or ecological level, for if behavioral novelties (i.e. not the result of selection) could also promote survival, then it would be impossible to distinguish this from final cause. Furthermore, the concepts of behavioral novelty and a teleonomy that can include a vision or goal of abstract states approach the concept of mind or psyche (although not necessarily in the human sense), and the comparison is unavoidable. Thus in order to deny final cause, the tendency is also to exclude concepts of mind.
This attempt to avoid the problem of final cause by the selective exclusion from evolution theory of principles that might introduce teleology, has resulted in an unrealistic separation of disciplines and timescales and, not surprisingly, some controversy. Odling-Smee (1988), citing B.C. Patten, for example, claims that the Modern Synthesis "leads us directly to the separation of organisms from their environments." He further states that:
...[the modern synthesis] "cannot model environmental changes in terms of anything at all... the synthetic theory lacks any medium of inheritance that could allow it to describe environmental changes as an integral part of the evolutionary process. Instead it is forced to assume that the environment is autonomous and that environmental change is a separate matter from changing organisms. The result is two disciplines: ecology, which handles environmental change, and evolutionary biology, which deals with changing organisms . . . Hence the Modern Synthesis has to rule out the possibility that the outputs of active organisms are capable of modifying their own subsequent inputs in evolutionarily significant ways."
According to Odling-Smee, this paradox was first pointed out by the physicist, Schrödinger (famous for the Schrödinger wave equation of quantum physics).
The common view in adaptation and evolution theories is that novelty (including survival strategy) originates in genetic variation, which is then selected by an independent environment. Because genes are the medium of inheritance, not phenotypes, all the phenotypic processes intervening between generations (i.e., everything the organism does) tend to be treated as merely the mechanism of interaction between the genotype and natural selection, but not itself a source of novelty. This view may owe much of its basis to the rejection of Lamarckism (which held, incorrectly, that a process of phenotypic novelty affecting evolution could operate through direct heredity); but it seems to be untenable if one considers that novel behavior can alter the evolutionary pathway in indirect ways. Yet behavior is typically reduced to a sophistication of genetic programming, and therefore a pre-selected result that cannot introduce novelty in ecological time.
It then follows that the organism is viewed as a passive agent acted upon by the total environment (which is virtually undefinable, yet assumed to include the influence of living organisms), ignoring autogenic effects (i.e. influences from the one organism that is always present). This is directly analogous to the Newtonian or atomistic worldview in which passive objects are "forced" externally. The opportunity for organisms to influence their own selection through behavioral novelty (Plotkin, 1988), and subsequently influence evolutionary pathways (Jantsch, 1980), is thus excluded from current evolution theory by the way it has been formalized.
Disciplinary compartmentalization
The division of disciplines thus preserves the contradiction of, on the one hand, a passive or random biological model for evolutionary novelty, and on the other, evidence of creativity in life strategies, decision-making, and our own (human) experience of choice. Perhaps by this division we are able to formulate useful first order theories that describe certain aspects of living organisms, however the arbitrary separation also insures that some second order system properties will be ignored. For example, if such unrealistic limitations of traditional theory are relaxed, the concept of internal causal processes influencing behavior and life strategies may be integrated with models for external environmental effects and interactions with other species, including feedbacks over both ecological and evolutionary time scales.
Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. "Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution." Boulder: Bear Mountain
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