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Form-function complimentarity
The autevolution view would be forced by the preceding arguments to treat purpose as a real quantity that is determined at the organismic level; and perhaps modeled best as the amplification of observership, which thus provides the theoretical basis for creativity at the organismic level. The presence of sophisticated biological examples for the magnification of this phenomena (observership), as noted earlier, implies that self-determination has evolved from rudimentary beginnings at the most fundamental level of material existence. Innovation at the organismic level may then exhibit original effects on the environment and, therefore, selection. This implies a complementarity between form and function over the course of generations, where (as in quantum physics) observation of one aspect results in change in the other, and both cannot be simultaneously defined. It would thus be impossible for living organisms to exactly determine both form and function, because functional definitions must allow morphological uncertainty and vice versa. This property of indeterminacy between form and function, from its simplest beginnings, must be assumed to exist in anything we call life. In contrast to the mechanistic view that function is determined solely by the relationship between morphology (including behavioral programs) and the environment (thus allowing for no inputs from the present), autevolution would formally assume that function, though largely influenced by genetics, development, and environment, is self-defined or modified (i.e., independently of prior selective factors and present environmental controls). This self-definition could then lead to future evolutionary forms that are not strict derivatives of independent environmental selection, but may in fact have and be partly the result of creative influences on their environment. This does not imply that we can study the source of self-definition, just as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle does not imply a study of uncertainty itself, but rather formulates theory around the limits to uncertainty. As argued earlier, an interdisciplinary autevolution theory requires formalization in much the same way, from these founding assumptions.
Teleology
An important issue is whether the question of teleology can be resolved by identifying the source of novelty as observer-participancy. Certainly any biological purpose of exclusively external origin violates the ability to form testable causal hypotheses in the same way that theistic views do, as there can be no process by which external purpose (final cause) can drive behavior, development, or evolution, unless it is reflected as an internal drive. The question considered here is if the appearance of purposeful goals can be treated scientifically if they are of internal definition within the system (or organism) under study.
Of course, as a general principle that can apply equally to the simplest and most complex of organisms, the concept of purpose must not be equated with consciously and knowingly planning for future events, as in the human case, which is clearly a recent evolutionary complexity (Crook, 1980; Wilbur, 1986). Still, the ability, expressed according to the complexity of the organism, to define function, expressed through novel behavior, would be an unrecognized case in Mayr's definitions, falling short of cosmic teleology but going beyond teleonomy (programmed direction where the program is strictly a result of prior selection). The case would rather be that functional definitions can alter teleonomic programs and provide them with an implied goal. To the extent that a future state can be represented by present function, this comes perhaps uncomfortably close to the notion that an end state can be causally effective.
Non-deterministic behavior
It is thus critical to this and similar worldviews to formally de-couple behavior from genetic determinism by providing an alternative causal process, yet this point is missed in recent accounts. Augros and Stanciu (1988), in a popular account, for example, miss this point entirely by arguing that the "new biology" cannot be derived from physical principles; whereas, presumably, the point is that it cannot be derived from classical (deterministic) principles. Even Plotkin's (1988) account does not provide a causal basis for "novelties" expressed as behavior. There are, meanwhile, a number of deterministic theories that relate function (and behavior) solely to genetics or other physical determinants, as in mechanical response to stimuli. It is by no means accepted among biologists that even human psychological experiences such as "free-will" are other than deterministic or genetic manifestations. Honderich (1988), for example, attempts to defend a deterministic approach for explaining even psychological phenomena associated with life (e.g., free-will, life hopes, etc.), but side-steps the obvious problem of quantum theory by claiming that it will one day be replaced by determinism (apparently ignoring evidence to the contrary). Such claims can be used to defend anything, and thus are useless -- we must work with the evidence at hand.
Observer participancy and biological phenomena
Although everyone is in doubt about the full implications of observer participancy, the principle is being linked to biological phenomena. A formal treatment of the relationship between observership and perception ("observer mechanics"), for example, has been published (Bennett et al., 1989). Since there would be little reason to doubt a connection between perception and behavior, a causal chain may be possible. Incorporating observership into models of how organisms translate form into function (and vice-versa) introduces a process that may also help explain evolutionary novelty at the system level. As a possible scenario, behavioral innovations may create a positive selective feedback, through the effect of environmental modification on the development and behavior of future generations, including other species. As natural selection is assumed to favor characteristics that are adaptive to the new environment, behavioral and functional innovations in one species could, in this way, influence the selection of even unrelated organisms, and thus become "registered" in the course of evolution.
Biological optimization
This view poses problems for optimization theories, stating that optimization would be impossible beyond a specific limit set by the fundamental uncertainties in the system (which, as yet, we have no way to quantify). This uncertainty principle also implies that we could not assume that a theoretical "optimal" actually exists, as a given state would be the combined effect of adaptation and unpredictable functional definitions that ensure nonequilibrium.
Selective feedback
Under such a view, even a slight ability to alter function could stimulate selective feedback and become self-reinforcing, giving rise to seemingly purposeful trends that actually reflect functional decisions made at the individual level. This means that we would have to view the course of evolution as partially determined by the organism, although not in the Lamarckian sense, but over the course of many generations through the combined effect of behavioral choices, their effect on the environment, and reciprocal selection. In a very real sense, selective forces would be seen as partly co-created by the organism; increasingly so in accordance with organismic complexity (e.g., Corning, 1983). It could also be suggested that the ability to affect evolution in this way has itself been selected for; thus creating a teleomatic process in evolution that may partly explain the emergence of the extreme capabilities of humans in this regard, with the further complexification of self-awareness, or consciousness (Crook, 1980, Wilber, 1986).
Coevolutionary implications
The possibility for natural selection to reward (and register) innovative behavioral interactions and environmental modifications would likely have coevolutionary implications in terms of interactive complexities (Corning, 1983; Goldberg, 1989). In a highly simplified example, Axelrod (1984) proposed a model of strategic interactions in terms of game theory (the prisoner's dilemma) to explain the evolution of cooperation. In this model, cooperative strategies emerge naturally from rudimentary organismic abilities, which are all included within the view considered here. These abilities are: (1) motivation for gain (self-defined purpose); (2) ability to recognize the presence or absence of benefits ( perception and self-reference); and (3) ability to modify behavior in innovative ways, based on current experience (observership or decision making). Given these basic psychobiological abilities (which in actual life would operate entirely in the present, not presupposing conscious awareness, memory, or intellectual reasoning; and given an environmental context that favors long-term interactions; the emergence of coevolutionary and cooperative systems is predicted at many levels of complexity.
Resemblance to information theory
Similarly, autevolution, as described, may bear a close resemblance to information theory, since by accepting organismic life as a causative agent (i.e., source of novelty), information and self-determination can become driving forces for system phenomena. Current theory relates life form with information by identifying DNA as the primary agent for defining organismic structure. But the evolutionary complementarity between form and function proposed here suggests a continuous interchange of information between organism and environment over generations, where decisions partly determine function, which may then modify and direct the evolution of form. It is interesting to speculate that, given this process, the basic model presented in Figure 1 for the growth of intellectual knowledge may also be a model for the evolution of species, complex organisms, communities, and ecosystems.
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Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. "Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution." Boulder: Bear Mountain
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Please address comments to: John Jay Kineman