The following discussion presents a simplified attempt at epistemological synthesis. The next section (Epistemology II) offers guidelines for evaluating the foundations of new theory (worldviews).
The epistemological model presented here (figure 1) is constructed to model the relationship between theory development, transitions to new founding assumptions (in either the gradualist sense of Toulmin or the revolutionary sense of Kuhn as described by Suppe, 1977), and processes of integration. The model attempts to combine the postpositivist tradition represented by logical empiricism, the instrumentalist view of independent theories, the realist view of seeking fundamental laws of nature, and the historicist tradition, which deals with the context for science in terms of paradigms of scientific theory, or worldviews. The dominant philosophy of science in recent years has been historical realism, which "recognizes an historically shifting yet relatively theory-neutral empirical basis for theory confirmation" (Goldberg, 1990). What is most important, however, is how the various epistemic processes interrelate and the results they produce.
The model presented here recognizes the existence and value of instrumental theories, but views the search for "real" elements of theory as a more robust pursuit. This form of realism (i.e., Platonic as opposed to existential) maintains that there is a hidden reality "out there," and is intent on representing it from basic principles. Theory then becomes a parsimonious attempt to represent natural law that is assumed to be universal, consistent, and unique (qualities that are also sought for the foundations of worldviews). Even though it is recognized that theory is never perfect, this philosophy maintains that closer approximations to reality are always possible, and that a unique, ultimate reality exists (Rohrlich, 1989). Thompson (1989), in contrast, argues for adopting a formal instrumentalist epistemology that accepts current (separated) ecological and evolutionary theory structures as part of a "family of interacting theories." This "semantic" construction of theory abandons the idea of constructing theory in terms of elements with "real" meaning, and instead constructs abstract models, according reality only to what can be observed or measured.
Thus instrumentalism represents a practical view of theories as they tend to form, whereas the realism described above provides a goal where their development may be more productively aimed. Each of these views actually contains elements of the other, and therefore they are not so much opposing views, as different aspects of the growth of knowledge (this relationship is represented in the model). The view presented here is that the goal of realism forces basic assumptions and theory structures to be questioned and modified (by increasing their predictive scope and thereby uncovering contradictions), and thus advances science through revolutions to new and more inclusive paradigms. Theoretical pluralities inherent in instrumentalism, on the other hand, may be balanced by attempts at theory integration or the development of interdisciplinary approaches. Such integration may reveal important contradictions in the foundations of theory, thus opening the way for new ideas, in a similar manner as revolutions in theory.
Figure 1 presents a model of the growth and evolution of knowledge facilitated by the identification of theoretical crises, combining philosophies of science. In this figure, scientific investigation (phase A) considers theory development within established paradigms, as a combination of phenomenal and causal studies which ultimately result in paradox due to limited assumptions (phase B). The transition phase (phase C) shows a process of crisis resolution, which necessitates a move from one theoretical basis to another (hopefully, but not necessarily more inclusive) view. Finally the figure shows theoretical pluralities (phase D), which may become linked or unified (phase E).
Phase A depicts a relationship between two methodological extremes, shown as the study and description of phenomena (on the left), and the search for explanations in terms of causal processes (on the right). This relationship includes the more restrictive positivist ideal of logical empiricism (i.e., hypothetico-deductive or strong inference methodology). In practice these methods often interrelate, giving a variety of operational approaches. On the one extreme, the essence of logical empiricism (Popper, 1959 and 1965) can be described as disproof of reasonable alternatives (hypotheses) in relation to observation and existing knowledge (i.e., which must necessarily be used when designing experiments and interpreting data). Within the established paradigm, new ideas that are contradicted by experiment (or prior knowledge) are rejected, and those that cannot be rejected (or as some philosophers argue, are confirmed) are added to the body of knowledge, which thus grows by accumulating consistent concepts. This quest for theory that is logically self-consistent and consistent with both observation and experiment is shown as the operating procedure or routine of science.
Yet philosophers have discovered the impossibility of defining an absolute set of knowledge. Historicism therefore recognizes that a body of knowledge that is built upon previous learning must be relative to a particular set of assumptions. These assumptions form a worldview that is defined by historical scientific development, cultural influences, and current philosophy. Furthermore, as described by Kuhn (1970) and his followers, there have repeatedly been scientific revolutions. This is also shown in figure 1, where the emphasis on empirical and theoretical studies in the primary cycle (phase A) leads to paradigm shifts in phase C. In this view, theory growth can become punctuated when contradictions in theory are seen as representing a philosophical and scientific crisis. This assumes, of course, a strong epistemological motivation to resolve apparent paradox, as is most prevalent in the concept of realism described here. Whereas apparent paradoxes (for example, resulting from causal explanations that are accorded some sense of reality) are crisis inducing within the old theoretical context (phase A), they are also the fuel for new worldviews (phase C). This combines philosophical traditions into a simple model of "punctuated equilibrium," between stable and transitory phases where opposite criteria are employed in the testing or selection process in these two phases. The epistemology in phase A operates on the assumption that two alternative explanations cannot both be correct. Phase C, however, operates on the assumption that two apparently paradoxical elements of theory that have otherwise been confirmed, must both be correct. (See Crisis Resolution)
Empirical methods of science thus operate within established thought structures (i.e. paradigms and worldviews), testing well-posed hypotheses to build a theory, but not testing the structure itself. As an example, empirical science does not test the idea of force directly: Under appropriate circumstances, it is equally valid to view gravity as a force or as an artifact of curved space, and the merits of each view is an independent issue from how they are formalized. Empirical testing is concerned with how forces act (e.g. f = ma) or interrelate (e.g. the equivalence of acceleration and gravitational force). The paradigm itself is judged first on whether or not it can be formalized, then on its overall predictive value and applicability to new phenomena. Therefore, the means for evaluating the foundations of theory are quite different from the means for testing hypotheses about its operation. Both can be scientific if they are not confused with each other; but confusion between these two levels of thought is common and characteristic of statements (and criticisms) about Gaia and other theories of self-directed evolution.
Still, the above synthesis is an incomplete picture, especially in terms of the debate between realism and instrumentalism (the idea that theory need not be based on a common reality), and the obvious existence of theoretical pluralism. The realist view works well in classical physics, which is more easily referenced to basic axioms, however other branches of science have not been so blessed. Instrumentalism is thus represented in several places in the model. In the form of purely phenomenal or descriptive theories (such as Ptolemy's model of a geocentric solar system, as described, for example, by Rohrlich, 1989) it might be seen as a hybrid of the two extremes in phase A (i.e., a theory which does not seek basic laws, but yet has predictive value based on the regularity of phenomena). Although logical contradictions can be identified within such theories, it is undetermined whether they will become crisis inducing or remain unchallenged. A more formal instrumentalism appears in phase E (right side), where theoretical pluralities are treated as a "family of interacting theories" (Thompson, 1989). As shown, it is questionable whether or not this approach will similarly preserve theoretical contradictions, or will eventually resolve them through some form of synthesis.
The immediate concern, in regard to autevolution, is to determine by what means the worldview portion of this model (i.e. new founding assumptions) can be evaluated. As mentioned earlier, the basis for theory cannot be evaluated in the same way as the content of theory (i.e. by logical empiricism and hypothesis testing). There are, however, specific criteria that can be employed for evaluating worldview assumptions. Five such criteria are discussed in the next section.
Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. "Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution." Boulder: Bear Mountain
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