The original version of this paper was presented in 1988 in San Diego at the annual AGU Chapman Conference, on which occasion the topic was James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis. I was on the epistemology panel and attempted to defend the stronger view of Gaia, which the majority of the conference was inclined to dismiss. I was very grateful for David Abram, who provided an eloquent defense (on a different basis) at a time when my ideas were only partially formed. As I struggled over the next three years to finish the paper, I also encouraged David to complete his, as we both experienced heavy fire from the reviewers. I was quite pleased when both papers appeared in the book "Scientists on Gaia" edited by Stephen H. Schneider and Penelope J. Boston, and published by MIT Press in 1991. However, that book is now out of print, and very little discussion has resulted on these ideas.
I have kept much of the original material, except for editorial changes, the addition of this foreword, more detail in the conclusion section, and correction of an omission in the list of criteria in the epistemology section. Editorial changes included the relabelling of terms used in the conference for more general application, and, most significantly, identifying the metaphysical backbone of the stronger view of self-determination (in organisms and systems) as a special and general theory of autevolution.
I conclude from recent publications that the discussion of mechanical vs. organic evolution (see Abram, 1991) is still very active. A recent article in Earth magazine by Niles Eldredge, for example, discusses the question of "What drives evolution" and cites a long and continuing debate between paleontologists and geneticists, one arguing for environmental driving forces, the other for internal genetic determinants. It also mentions the problem of "stasis" in the evolution of organisms and ecosystems (Gould's punctuated equilibrium), which is a problem for both theories that would otherwise predict more continual change, either from genetic or environmental changes. Both of these views are mechanical, which a growing body of literature seriously questions as an exclusive perspective.
The thesis I present here on autevolution proposes that there is an organic process that could also contribute to punctuated stability, as well as apparent directions in evolutionary pathways, self-determining properties of living systems that are fundamental to stronger forms of Gaia theory, and many other apparent paradoxes in our current understanding of the origins and evolution of life. I have concluded that representing this factor rigorously in both ecology and evolution theory, however, requires a formal recognition of life itself as a creative property within all organisms, and requires an explanation of its evolution from primitive origins. Similar "vitalistic" ideas have been proposed before in various forms, but these were largely unconvincing in their attempts (if any) to identify a causal process or useful model for how creativity is generated. As a result these historical views have failed to free themselves from the limits of mechanical processes that otherwise are assumed to explain all that we see. The mechanical view is particularly pernicious because proponents tend to separate phenomena into two prejudicial classes, those things that are explained mechanically, and those things that have not yet been explained. The obvious third category is often presumed to be non-science. Some views suggest that creativity can be an "emergent property" of complex systems, even though those systems are basically mechanical. In my opinion, this view ultimately fails without a more elemental non-mechanical (i.e., non-deterministic) basis. The matter of determinism vs. non-determinism is hotly debated with regard to consciousness.
If taken to their logical extreme, mechanical views must eventually conclude that any emergence of creative experience would necessarily be an illusion, perhaps sufficiently unpredictable to give the feeling of free will, but also essentially deterministic and thus the effect of other processes but not itself causal. This means that not only are all of our actions determined (although not in an obvious way to us), but also our experience of deciding to perform those actions, debate alternatives, agree, rebel, and so on, is also predetermined; and if knowing this information prompts anyone to reverse those decisions in an attempt to disprove determinism, the fact that this information would be written and become known, and that consequential changes would then be made, and precisely what those changes would be, was also determined, etc. This ultimately fatalistic view is a logical deterministic trap that is analogous to a computer program getting stuck in an infinite loop, but it is extremely hard to argue out of this on any basis other than one's own intuition and experience.
I believe that one epistemological criteria may be invoked here that may be surprising in this context - that of parsimony. Determinists generally assume that parsimony is in their favor, but the argument is simply that the deterministic chain of explanations is infinitely long, with a new supposition added to match every unpredicted thought. Even if one wants to believe this is what is really happening, it is not the simplest and best way to describe it for understanding and predictive purposes, which is the goal of scientific parsimony. Even if prediction has fundamental limits (as a non-deterministic worldview predicts), that is better than explanations that are entirely post-hoc and untestable due to their infinitely long chain of assumptions. Thus, while one may assume a very complex set of causes influencing organismic function (and behavior), we must assume on the basis of experience (at least for more complex organisms) that more than one outcome is possible from a given set of deterministic conditions (no matter how precisely defined), and that a participatory "self" is involved in making the choice. To assume otherwise is to either deny human experience (obviously unproductive, since the ultimate goal of science is to understand human experience), or to ascribe all experience to pure randomness (again a denial of experiential evidence). This conclusion does not require, however, that the set of possible choices be infinite. In some cosmic sense all possible experience may be pre-determined and free will may actually be a matter of selecting from this set (as some beliefs hold), but that is a much farther removed problem than the one at hand.
An even more parsimonious theory for the complex phenomena of psyche can be arrived at by seeking an evolutionary basis for creative process within fundamental aspects of nature. It is certainly no less valid to assume that psyche evolved from primitive origins than to assume (without evidence) that it emerged suddenly and mysteriously as a non-deterministic process from a critical stage of deterministic complexity (which is most often assumed). The Darwinian model established the concept of incremental evolution for biological form against strong prejudice, and I suggest that the same situation now exists for the evolution of psyche. Thinking in terms of incremental evolution, the seemingly emergent property associated with true novelty must instead be sought in a fundamental property of nature that has been acted upon by natural selection in a similar manner to the evolution of physical form. It then follows that more primative forms of psyche exist in all organisms.
The organic view may also allow an extension of concepts from the Odum school of systems ecology. It has come to be accepted that certain system properties seem to be "more than the sum of their parts," giving rise to the concept of "emergent properties." While this may be a useful assumption at the ecological level, the previous arguments suggest that the parts (in this case the evolutionary building blocks of psyche), must have contained certain eventually emergent aspects of the whole. In this way, the fundamental wholeness of nature (strongly implied cosmologically, quantum physically, and as I argue, psychologically) is conserved within every aspect that has distilled from that whole. Such properties could indeed be both cause and caused, depending on the perspective from which it is viewed (a sort of evolutionary bootstrapping).
In searching out these ideas regarding a fundamental evolutionary basis for modeling creativity and psyche, one can find such a basis in the biological evolution of quantum properties of matter.
After publishing in 1991 I have been somewhat reserved about promoting these ideas because they imply significant modifications to current evolution and other theory (and scientific worldviews), and because they argue from a philosophical and metaphysical basis that may seem reminiscent of the vitalistic metaphysics that evolution theory had to be initially rescued from. However, it is precisely in these mental disciplines (within which we could include mathematics) that we must look for guidance on new perspectives, when the old ones have exhausted their usefulness. This fact came to be appreciated by two well known philosophers, Thomas Kuhn, in terms of "paradigms" and "worldviews," and Carl Popper, in terms of "metaphysical research programs," which were seen as foundational to all science and the essence of scientific revolutions. A return to metaphysical inquiry is not a return to pre-Darwinian metaphysics, but an attempt to the next important step, one that could not properly be envisioned prior to having a solid theoretical framework.
One must be cautious to avoid over-using the philosophy of scientific revolutions as an excuse to invent fanciful explanations that have little productive value in science. Scientists are generally not ignorant of alternative views, nor are many of them insensitive to the potential value of alternative views as "true" constructs within various disciplines or practices (scientific or not). Most philosophers of science have concluded (often later in life) that there may be no absolutely true perspective from the human frame of reference -- that what is true of nature is generally beyond the reach of human perception, including our best scientific models and theories. Nevertheless, it is extremely useful to us, bound as we are by our perception, to construct better and better approximations to reality that have predictive and explanatory value. By profession we are trained to use caution and proceed methodically, so that a body of consistent knowledge can be built with the minimum of wasted time. This has as much to do with what we, as a scientific profession and as a society, are capable of understanding as it does with the true nature of reality. Hence, steps such as I attempt here must be taken with utmost care. I have attempted to refine this to the best of my ability over the course of about a decade, and I have only recently become willing to promote these views more widely because of the value I see in them for both science and society.
In preparing this forward and revision of terms in the paper, I again visited some of the recent literature. I was particularly struck by philosophical developments in evolutionary cybernetics, and the lack of similar developments in the primary life sciences. It seems that scientists attempting to create life in a computer are, perhaps understandably, more concerned with the fundamental questions of what life really is than people dedicated to studying it's present forms. In this regard the television character "Commander Data" (in the recent Star Trek The Next Generation series), may have been a quite prophetic invention -- the android who reveals more about humanity than the human characters, simply because he is attempting to emulate them.
As is now popularly known, physicists also have stumbled into these fundamental questions of life because of their discovery of uncomfortable limits to classical physics theory that seem to involve phenomena normally associated with life and particularly with psychology and perception. Correspondingly, my decision to better focus and republish these ideas was stimulated by a recently announced success in laboratory physics that seems to support the quantum-indeterminacy view which I suggested should be incorporated into models of evolution. In my home town, Boulder, Colorado, physicists have succeeded in creating a "Bose-Einstein" condensate under laboratory conditions. This is a quantum correlated state of matter existing at macroscopic dimensions (high quantum numbers), a theoretical possibility imagined by the early quantum researchers thinking about possible mechanisms for consciousness. At that time, however, it was not producible under laboratory conditions. These events demonstrate two important things: First, that macroscopic quantum behavior is possible; and second that such behavior is limited to special arrangements of matter.
The existence of Bose-Einstein states seems to demonstrate that macroscopic quantum uncertainty is a real phenomenon, at least from the perspective of our perceptual world. It has also been suggested that it is a good model for the basis of perception and some form of proto-consciousness. This was a point I argued for in the paper, based on my earlier literature study on the quantum nature of biological sensory systems, particularly hearing and sight. It is by no means demonstrated, of course, that these astounding discoveries reveal a sufficient basis for perception and consciousness (along with all of the intricacies of psychology, culture, etc); but they do appear to be laying an essential foundation that could very well lead in that direction. Although the actual structure must obviously be different from that used in the laboratory, the fundamental issue of "magnification" of quantum behavior (credited to Niels Bohr in my paper) may now be an issue of how and where, and not so much if.
In fact there is now serious work being done to demonstrate the basis for consciousness in correlated matter (Bose-Einstein states of matter) existing in biological structures within neurons. Hameroff and Penrose (1996a) claim in a recent paper that it is likely that such a basis exists in neuronal cells (please see the original paper for the embedded references). Quoting from that paper:
Features of consciousness difficult to understand in terms of conventional neuroscience have evoked application of quantum theory, which describes the fundamental behavior of matter and energy. In this paper we propose that aspects of quantum theory (e.g. quantum coherence) and of a newly proposed physical phenomenon of quantum wave function "self-collapse" (objective reduction: OR -Penrose, 1994) are essential for consciousness, and occur in cytoskeletal microtubules and other structures within each of the brain's neurons...
...Where and how in the brain can quantum effects occur? Warm, wet and noisy, the brain at first glance seems a hostile environment for delicate quantum phenomena which generally demand isolation and cold stillness (superconductors), or energy pumping of crystals (lasers). Nonetheless, various authors have implicated ion channels, ions themselves, DNA, pre-synaptic grids and cytoskeletal microtubules as somehow mediating "standard" quantum effects. In a dualist context, Beck and Eccles (1992) proposed that an external "conscious self" might influence the apparently random quantum effects acting on neurotransmitter release at the pre-synaptic grid within each neural axon. Stapp (1993) has suggested that (SR) wave function collapse in neurons is closely related to consciousness in the brain. In our view, cytoskeletal microtubules are the most likely sites for quantum coherence, OR and consciousness.
On the subject of "self-collapse" - analogous to the "decision event" referred to in my paper, Hameroff and Penrose also state:
Consciousness, it is argued, requires non-computability (Penrose, 1989; 1994). In standard quantum theory there is no non-computable activity, the R process being totally random. The only readily available apparent source of non-computability is OR (and Orch OR) self-collapse. An essential feature of consciousness might then be a large-scale quantum-coherent state maintained for a considerable time. OR (Orch OR) then takes place because of a sufficient mass displacement in this state, so that it indulges in a self-collapse which somehow influences or controls brain function. Microtubules seem to provide easily the most promising place for these requirements.
The following is a sketch of a neuron, showing the microtubules:
Figure 1. Schematic of central region of neuron (distal axon and dendrites not shown) showing parallel arrayed microtubules interconnected by MAPs. Microtubules in axons are lengthy and continuous, whereas in dendrites they are interrupted and of mixed polarity. Linking proteins connect microtubules to membrane proteins including receptors on dendritic spines. (From Hameroff and Penrose, 1996a)
Hameroff and Penrose (1996b) provide a good history of these ideas in the introduction to another recent paper (please see the original paper for the embedded references):
The "hard problem" of incorporating the phenomenon of consciousness into a scientific world-view involves finding scientific explanations of qualia, or the subjective experience of mental states (Chalmers, 1995; 1996). On this, reductionist science is still at sea. Why do we have an inner life, and what exactly is it? One set of philosophical positions, addressing the hard problem, views consciousness as a fundamental component of physical reality. For example an extreme view - "panpsychism" - is that consciousness is a quality of all matter: atoms and their subatomic components having elements of consciousness (e.g. Spinoza, 1677; Rensch, 1960). "Mentalists" such as Leibniz and Whitehead (e.g. 1929) contended that systems ordinarily considered to be physical are constructed in some sense from mental entities. Bertrand Russell (1954) described "neutral monism" in which a common underlying entity, neither physical nor mental, gave rise to both. Recently Stubenberg (1996) has claimed that qualia are that common entity. In monistic idealism, matter and mind arise from consciousness - the fundamental constituent of reality (e.g. Goswami, 1993). Wheeler (1990) has suggested that information is fundamental to the physics of the universe. From this, Chalmers (1995;1996) proposes a double-aspect theory in which information has both physical and experiential aspects.
Among these positions, the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (1929; 1933) may be most directly applicable. Whitehead describes the ultimate concrete entities in the cosmos as being actual "occasions of experience," each bearing a quality akin to "feeling." Whitehead construes "experience" broadly - in a manner consistent with panpsychism - so that even "temporal events in the career of an electron have a kind of 'protomentality'." Whitehead's view may be considered to differ from panpsychism, however, in that his discrete 'occasions of experience' can be taken to be related to "quantum events" (Shimony, 1993). In the standard descriptions of quantum mechanics, randomness occurs in the events described as quantum state reductions--these being events which appear to take place when a quantum-level process gets magnified to a macroscopic scale.
As a final note in this section, the information about quantum phenomena and consciousness is presented here only to indicate the reasonableness of adopting an indeterminacy model within autevolution theory. It is not necessary to identify the biological structure responsible, but sufficient to show that reasonable alternatives exist that can be tested. My goal is to develop the most parsimonious worldview and theory basis from the intersection of disciplines involved. On this level I am reasoning on the preponderance of evidence that indeterminism is at the very least, an important scientific worldview and that corresponding theories may account for and be scientifically predictive of much that is observed. I conclude on this basis that it is reasonable and important to investigate the possible evolution of observership as well as its possible effects on evolution.
An important concern in producing the original paper was to work from existing paradigms, while at the same time arguing for their expansion or integration. This was to allow explanation of unfamiliar phenomena from established principles of nature. Only in reference to existing concepts is it possible to demonstrate that new assumptions are needed to resolve currently paradoxical explanations of phenomena such as system and organic self-organization, cooperation, the similarity between psychological processes and quantum processes, and apparent (though hotly debated) directionality and punctuated stasis in evolution. As discussed in the paper, paradoxical explanations are revealed when the full set of assumptions underlying a theory are combined from various disciplines. Thus we may understand new phenomena best in a context that is closest to prior modes of explanation, yet strives to combine the most successful views from all relevant disciplines. In other words, an entirely new basis for explanation may be interesting, but will be extremely unlikely to affect current scientific views or to develop correspondences with them. Accordingly, I believe we must look seriously at quantum-indeterminacy as a basic phenomena (a "real" construct) that must be extended to other disciplines, especially evolution and ecology. Regardless of the fact that quantum theory is not (or likely ever will be) complete for physicists, and that present thinking is exploring hidden dimensions and multiple "realities," the most fundamental aspect of the theory from our perspective - indeterminacy - appears to be incontrovertible at this point, despite the most determined efforts to find other explanations. In our best scientific traditions, this constitutes solid grounds for acceptance, and good reason to consider the implications beyond physics. Anyone who does this in some depth is forced to conclude profound changes in the way we view nature and necessarily evolution, since evolution is so fundamental to how we understand living form. In this light, it is so unlikely that other disciplines can remain unaffected by these discoveries in physics that it becomes little more than stubbornness to retain classical assumptions, for example in biological theories of behavior and evolution. In a number of biological disciplines as well as psychology, correspondences with quantum phenomena are indicated and appropriate biological structures for manifesting such phenomena have been predicted based on current knowledge. We have in such cases, both correlation and "mechanism" (causal process), as well as the possibility of resolving important paradoxes in current theory. This is sufficient justification for pursuing theoretical development of these ideas in many fields.
At the same time, as implied above, I do not see the value in analogies with quantum phenomena that are not based on this first step; that is, the implications of a macroscopic uncertainty principle for living organisms and their evolution (i.e., the special theory). That is foundational to broader implications, as it implies a modification to deterministic theories and perhaps considerable study of what those modifications imply. While it may be interesting at this stage to speculate on further questions of organization, or about the consciousness of superorganisms such as Gaia, it is somewhat premature in terms of solid theory development. These presumed implications may not be easily made relevant at present in the context of building theory from an observational and experiential basis, which science does. For example, many holistic ideas may be compelling as metaphors for visualizing connectedness beyond space-time reality due to the existence of higher dimensions (non-locality, in the jargon of physics), and the direct knowledge of God (in whatever form) may indeed prove to be the most important human experience; but such entirely universal views of origins (ontology) may not lend themselves to comprehension in worldly terms (formalization in predictive theory) -- that is, within existing scientific worldviews. Even if we accept that all of reality originates from a single creative principle (and retains that principle in some way), our methodical construction of scientific theory is still more concerned with describing the limitations placed on that reality (e.g., the limits and effects of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, not the nature of the uncertainty itself) and hence the nature we can observe and predict. We are, however, in an odd situation where having achieved some success at describing the limits to a perhaps unlimited potential (in quantum matter), and how those limits seem to define our world, we have subtly constructed the idea that the limitations themselves are reality. That is a terrible mistake, not at all required by science.
If I seem bold in these assertions here, my goal in the paper is to ground them as much as possible and invite constructive criticism so that we can decide as a scientific society if autevolution, especially in terms presented here, has a place in our understanding of nature.
I propose redefining the weak vs. strong Gaia taxonomy adopted for working purposes at the Chapman conference as "ecological Gaia" vs. "evolutionary Gaia," respectively in this edition of the paper. I have also termed what I believe to be the essential foundation for the stronger, evolutionary Gaia concepts as autevolution. This is to provide more general application and to clarify the epistemological issues. I have found very little historical use of this term (an attentive historian may correct me on this), and thus, hopefully, it can be used to identify the worldview and class of theories implied here, with few historical connotations. It may share metaphorical similarities with other theories such as autogenesis, a discredited evolution theory that organisms can evolve themselves independently of interactions with the environment (which is not what is proposed here), or various forms of vitalism that generally attempt to explain biology and evolution in terms of creative manifestation. Autevolution instead attempts to incorporate plausible creative processes, based on sound theory, into biology and evolution in a way that is consistent with know processes (i.e., the modern synthesis). I believe autevolution is significantly different from most if not all of these rejected views also because it can be formalized on the basis of testable processes and offers new predictions that can be tested directly.
In ecological terms, the idea that systems (including living organisms) can influence their own processes is not especially new, nor is it a problem epistemologically except when one explores fully the presumed origins of such possibilities. If we ignore the issue of the origin of creativity, there are many references to self-influence and creative behavior in the literature, not all intended metaphorically. But the idea that these same organisms can have influenced their own evolution in completely innovative or creative ways is what challenges the current mechanical (or deterministic) worldview of nature because it cannot avoid the issue of ultimate origin and ultimate destiny (i.e., the problem of teleology). It is this aspect that becomes either highly problematic within current theory, or revolutionary (discussed extensively in the paper). The distinction between the more easily handled ecological view and the problematic evolutionary view helps emphasize the broader implications of what is proposed and reflects the current epistemological paradox that keeps ecology and evolution disconnected (also discussed in the paper). I argue that the compelling issue of any Gaia theory does not reveal itself completely until we attempt to understand it in evolutionary terms.
The separation between ecological and evolutionary views has been pervasive in recent history, yet I believe also arbitrary and ultimately undesirable. Since evolution is at the root of biological thinking, the problem of creative influence (which is at the root of Gaia) must be dealt with in terms of evolution. Restriction of scientific thought about self organization to weaker and more palatable forms of Gaia, and thus primarily to ecological language, which has been generally favored in the literature, is thus an expedient that avoids dealing with the important epistemological issues. The primary issue is that our basic model of evolution, and thus the main process by which present ecological interactions developed, is based on exclusively deterministic mechanisms (stochastic processes notwithstanding, as they are assumed to be deterministically based and thus evolutionarily neutral, even if important as an explanation of certain kinds of variation). This view cannot consider creative (non-deterministic) influences as causal. Ecology, on the other hand, embraces at least the language of creativity regarding organisms (and occasionally communities or ecosystems), but it is always presumed that in some magical and unarticulated way complexity is producing apparently creative behavior (which is nevertheless assumed to be constructed from genetic, developmental, and environmental influences that vary from physical determinants at most randomly). It follows that ecologists use the language of creative influence merely for descriptive convenience. Yet that magic attributed to complexity theory, a basic schizophrenia that allows ecologists to speak of evolution, and vice versa, is inadequately constructed and deserves questioning. At this fundamental level the ecological form of biological systems theory cannot be merged with an evolutionary form unless both deal explicitly with the problem of creative influence. Much of the paper deals with laying the foundation for this, as well as laying a detailed foundation for evaluating the modifications to our current worldview in epistemological terms. I believe that this level of rigor is necessary for such fundamental change to be considered.
Stated simply (and incompletely), the definitions I propose are that the special theory of autevolution deals with the evolutionary implications for organisms of functional uncertainty at the phenotypic level, and the general theory of autevolution deals with the further complexification of this phenomena within more inclusive systems (societies, ecosystems, and concepts of Gaia). I have avoided use of the recent term autopoiesis or its variations in this regard, because it is generally defined deterministically and does not deal directly with the phenomenon of the 'observer,' which is nevertheless a central concept in some descriptions of autopoiesis. Autopoiesis means literally "self-making." I define autevolution as "evolution of the self and its reciprocal influence on evolution," considering 'self' to be something treated by theory separately from structure. Autevolution needs only to imply "self-influencing," recognizing the primary role of physical constraints, and the ability for Darwinian processes to select for the quantum-correlated structure that allows self-influence, if it is adaptive. The "self" in this regard, then refers to the "observer" of quantum physics, which has a true complimentarity relationship (through evolutionary time) with living form.
The main idea I propose for autevolution is that the present model for biogenic environmental change (in ecological time) should include not only first-order deterministic processes (genetic expression, development, ecology) but also second-order effects from phenotypic decisions required by a fundamental indeterminism of organismic function (macroscopic indeterminacy that manifests itself as functional decisions, or modifications of function otherwise implied imperfectly by form). These decisions and functional definitions affect selection through feedbacks between behavior and the environment. Such second-order (non-deterministic) effects, if admitted, would be active in evolutionary time through environmental "registration" (expanding E. P. Odum's concept of the total environment to include information implied by organismic presence, behavior, and physical modifications organisms may make to the environment), the cumulative effect on natural selection, and thus the course of evolutionary events (genetic variation and natural selection). This approach is discussed in the paper, and taken as the foundation for the special form of autevolution.
The point, then, is to discuss the evidence and possible process of non-deterministic influences on evolution that may come from within the individual, not necessarily giving them primacy, but allowing them to be acted upon by natural selection - the mechanism for inheritance being the information from previous generations recorded in the "total environment." This model may merge well with the new field of "memetics" where memes are thought forms that can be passed among perceptual beings, and which can presumably be recorded in and read from physical structures (or events) that have been influenced in some unique way by the meme. In the autevolution model, observership itself may be the original meme.
In the autevolution view presented here, biological forms are only partially "self-created," using a psychological definition of self, although the effect may increase with complexity. This is not to say that the opposite view (that life is entirely creative, with deterministic mechanism being a limiting or temporary case) would not also be correct, taking into account all of evolutionary time; but it is the former view that presents itself to us for study, in our common mode of perception.
The separation into special and general theories follows traditions (Einstein's special and general theories of relativity and Darwin's Origin of Species and Descent of Man) that help distinguish essential foundations from their less obvious implications, and thus lends itself better to evaluation in stages. In this case, the special theory deals with the process of evolution of reproductive organisms where the mechanical part of inheritance and selection is well defined and probably dominant. The proposed basis of the special theory introduces an autevolutionary process at the organismic level, assuming that even minimally enhanced quantum coherence is the basis for perception and functional indeterminacy. This is quite a step in itself because the basis for perception is hardly settled, and the implications of this view for all life are revolutionary in many fields. While I make reference, then, to implications for larger system co-determination (or co-influence), the process was not dealt with in the first paper at the system level.
The general theory applies to systems where, given the special theory, interspecific effects from self-determination are possible at the system level. Extending the present ideas to ecosystems, Gaia, and perhaps the living universe, would logically be part of the general theory. An interesting (and more poetic) perspective toward the general theory dealing with possible non-local aspects of observership (connected experiential states between organisms due to superposition of the combined wave functions associated with consciousness in different individuals) was presented by Dana Zohar in 1990, in The Quantum Self. In any case, phenomena described in the general theory may be primarily dominated by non-deterministic autevolution processes.
I have not formulated these suggested theories beyond the hints provided here and in the paper: I have only discussed their philosophy and metaphysics. The practical demonstration and consequent fruitfulness of these ideas has yet to be demonstrated (such formulation and fruitfulness being the important remaining epistemological criteria identified in the in the paper). Still, I believe the mathematics of the proposed "special theory" as it affects neo-Darwinism would be rather simple, and could be relatively easy to simulate in a computer model (perhaps some already exist). If this were done, I would expect the simulation to confirm the punctuated stability behavior diagrammed in Figure 1, and that rather bizarre evolutionary pathways (not explainable strictly by the existing environment) could be produced by altering functional definitions in the ancestral line. This would require, as a minimum, (a) representing functional definitions within the organism, (b) linking behavior to perceived function, (c) associating present structure as a constraint on functional definition, (d) providing for environmental modification (or selection) by the organism, and (e) incorporating a means for future organisms (same or different species) to extract accurate information from the pattern of environmental alteration (or simply the aspect of the environment that has been selected by ancestors).
In discussing causal process in the paper, I used the term "observer-participancy" or "observership" following the usage of John Archibald Wheeler. In a brief scan of the literature, I noticed that this is often being referred to as "the measurement problem" implying less confidence in describing the phenomenon, and perhaps little progress in understanding it. "The measurement problem" is simply that perception (however defined) seems to be involved in determining specific states of nature within certain realms (sub-atomic particles and, as I argue, living systems, with obvious analogies in psychology), in apparent contradiction to the exclusive way that more mechanical views of nature have been formulated previously. The causal (or at least influential) part of this process seems to rest with properties that are most often thought of as psychological or perceptual.
This is certainly a revolutionary result, if maintained, and must have implications for ecology, evolution, psychology, sociology, and other disciplines. Hence conservatism is warranted in its application, but there is a very strong body of experience now to indicate that the issue of some kind of transcendent reality as a primary cause for certain classes of natural phenomena will not go away. This does not mean that every event, or even the majority, can best be explained from transcendent causes. The majority of cause-effect relationships in our everyday observation of the time-space world seem clearly to be between classical spatial objects interacting through time, not between objects extending into different reality dimensions (except for psychological phenomena); and most of these interactions are adequately described by mechanical theories. The discovery of macroscopic quantum behavior, considered within our current understanding, says that some unpredictable processes may be caused, or at least influenced, from transcendent dimensions (relative to conventional four-dimensional space-time), within prescribable limits, through specific structures. If we admit that there are observable phenomena associated with the apparently transcendent dimensions (as modern quantum physics assumes), the role of science is still to determine the extent of such influences and their implications in our world, because it is our present-world observations and experience that science seeks to model. The search for transcendent dimensions and causes becomes more metaphysics than physics, and its primary purpose is to produce a satisfying theoretical completeness (i.e., "theory of everything"). Unless unequivocally demonstrated, the feasibility of this goal remains highly questionable on the philosophical grounds that it may be logically impossible for any system to contain a complete model (or theoretical understanding) of its own origins. This means that while it may be ultimately inconclusive to dwell on the full origins of observership, the effects of observership cannot reasonably be left out of scientific theory in biological and other fields. It is simply a phenomenon we must deal with more or less at face value, within our current stage of understanding.
The origin of perception and consciousness (presumably going beyond mechanical stimulus-response models) also has potential explanations in this view. First, however, we have to identify the problem. There is a popular view that chaos theory may hold an explanation for free will and thus consciousness because it is successful in describing some system-level aspects of unpredictable phenomena (such as weather, smoke plumes, etc.). However, there is a big difference between unpredictability and indeterminism as discussed in quantum physics. The former is a matter of human knowledge and the practicality of carrying out complex calculations that theoretically could produce arbitrary precision to any prediction. However, quantum uncertainty states that there is a fundamental limit to such "knowability" and that even if the calculations could be carried out infinitely, there would still remain a fundamental uncertainty in the actual cause-effect relationships in nature. This difference is a metaphysical and epistemological issue about which there is considerable debate. For many philosophers, a classical system, no matter how complex or chaotic, could not suddenly develop non-deterministic (i.e., truly creative) properties if such properties did not exist at the most fundamental level. If, on the other hand, perception is recognized as a property of all matter, with corresponding complexity, its gradual elaboration through evolution, including the evolution of complex systems, would be quite in keeping with our understanding of how biological functions evolve. The various abilities animals have to move are elaborations of more primitive movement mechanisms, biochemical processes are elaborations of more primitive chemistry, etc. What these functions can specifically accomplish may emerge with complexity, but the marvel of nature is how they have evolved, not, as previously thought, how they emerged spontaneously. Autevolution is thus a refutation of the idea that consciousness spontaneously emerged with complexity, unless one is discussing a specific form of consciousness (e.g., human, ape, cetacean, etc.).
The attempt to explain quantum behavior deterministically has led some physicists to think of multiple "realities" existing simultaneously, presumably in hidden dimensions. A popular theory, and a claimed resolution to the Cat Paradox, is the many worlds interpretation of reality (e.g., Everett worlds). This theory seeks to remove the observer from any privileged role in physics, thus striving for a fully mechanical (deterministic) worldview. Other "meta-theories" include many histories (similar to many worlds) and a "many minds" interpretation, which may be closest to Everett's original concept. All of these interpretations involve hidden dimensions or entire hidden universes, and I believe they fail from the same kind of post-hoc cascading complexity of explanations described earlier for all deterministic interpretations. In this respect, deterministic theories may be circular, because they attempt to disprove the appearance of choice as a creative act either by constructing explanations retrospectively and denying than any other course of events was possible (a singular determinism), or claiming that in fact all choices were made and experienced simultaneously (a multiple determinism). The multiple determinism view claims that apparent uncertainty in the classical realm is derived from an unlimited number of well-defined universes (thus providing the optional states that seem to exist in any given event). The approach thus remains just as unpredictive as the non-deterministic view but adds the seemingly unnecessary denial of one's actual experience of choosing (which is obviously reported in the human case). Regardless of the current appeal of finding a mechanical explanation for things, these approaches are not more logically parsimonious or of greater predictive value than the non-deterministic view, which attempts to explain phenomena in terms of observable conditions, within a statistically predictable uncertainty, and admits to a fundamental unknown involving the phenomenon of experience itself.
It is a problem for many to adopt a non-deterministic world view when observation, which seems inseparable from some form of vialism, also seems so intimately connected with deciding physical states, with causes and effects that transcend our known dimensions. But determinism, as it must be laboriously constructed to account for quantum behavior, still does not eliminate the uncertainty issue from the classical perspective or as it would apply to otherwise classical biological systems. Holding onto determinism in these contexts seems to be more a matter of tradition than scientific method or epistemology.
David Bohem's holism theory of "implicate order," which bears greatest similarity to the interpretation conclude here (from different origins), provides for the primacy of our perceptual classical world as a stable reality (as far as we can tell, and as far as necessary for the theory), but assumes undefined potential at the quantum level.
We would miss the point, however, to be overly concerned about which interpretation of quantum physics is correct, because all of them at this point confirm "the measurement problem" (quantum uncertainty, appearing from our perspective to be associated with the act of observing, hence requiring a definition of the observer as a real entity), and "non-locality" (the troubling but well documented result that certain related quantum events require communication at greater than light speed, thus implying connectedness in dimensions beyond known space-time reality). For biologists the choice is perhaps most dramatic, because they must ultimately deal with the observer in biological form. Biological observership (to the extent that the observer-experience phenomenon has been magnified) must then hold an influential position in the universe, not an accident or otherwise result of physical and genetic determinism, as is most often described. This is a problem for anyone wedded to anthropocentric interpretations, because it is not just human observership that is so implicated. Just as geocentricism eventually had to give way under the relentless pressure of science, our cultural views of humans occupying a special place in creation have also consistently given way and must continue to do so. It may be time to recognize philosophically that the most useful and parsimonious view of nature involves life as a fundamentally creative, decision-making process, infusing our classical reality from outside traditional deterministic limits. This seem to occur through non-deterministic, macroscopic (or perhaps more properly, systemic) structures that are predicted by quantum theory. In addition to their confirmation in physical experiments, such structures are strongly implied in living organisms (particularly sensory organs and nerve cells). Precisely how creative decision-making is explained may be essential its final acceptance, but it is perhaps less important at present than the current results that indicate its existence and require that it be accounted for in all theoretical constructs where it is implicated. Physicists, philosophers, mystics, and theologians must deal with the possible causes of observership, but biologists, psychologists, and cyberneticists (or cyber-noeticists) must deal with the important implications.
Another recent experiment, by the same Boulder scientist involved in producing Bose-Einstein condensates, demonstrated the simultaneous existence of dual quantum states of a single particle. This result is basically consistent with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum phenomenon but perhaps bringing it into closer agreement with an idea that "observed" properties exist only as part of the observing system. This latter view would seem to account for multiple eigenstates (i.e., "observed" states) existing simultaneously. These reported results, and speculative interpretations, are compatible with the autevolution view I was describing, and suggests to me a possible resolution to the famous Schrodinger's "cat paradox."
The cat paradox is a thought problem based on the "delayed choice" experiments and EPR paradox of quantum physics. It was proposed by Edwin Schrodinger to dramatize the apparent philosophical problem of observership. Briefly, if we accept that various experiments (EPR and delayed choice experiments) established that the act of observation affects not only the state of an observed particle, but also that of "non-local" particles that had previously interacted with the observed particle, and that these states are apparently retroactive (in other words, once they are observed, we can deduce what state they logically were in at a prior time), the result seems paradoxical. First there seems to be difficulty with the apparent conclusion that that it is possible for any state to be defined before some part of it is observed. One objection to this is that the role of the observer in determining physical states becomes central. Furthermore, if historical states are also dependent on such observation, it is unclear what state matter actually exists in prior to observation. This seems particularly unacceptable if we include a living organism, say a cat, linked to the observing system in such a way that the detected state of a quantum particle determines if the cat lives or dies. In this case, the "measurement problem" implies that the cat is neither alive nor dead (Copenhagen interpretation) until someone (defined how?) observes it, at which time the event appears to have taken place at a prior time. Alternatives to this interpretation are that the cat is both alive and dead simultaneously (many worlds interpretation) or that there are multiple realities in the observer (many minds interpretation).
Hence, as the thought exercise goes, one must assume that the entire system, including the cat, is in an undetermined state prior to (or independent of) observation, and this reasoning can be extended to scientists observing the systems, and so on, never arriving at a definitive observer. The problems raised are: (1) observership, (2) delayed choice, (3) non-locality, and (4) mixed or simultaneous states of matter (or, in alternative views, multiple simultaneous realities or hidden dimensions).
I believe there are a number of philosophical errors in the structure of this thought problem. First, it is framed around the idea that there is an implied difference between observers (presumably with consciousness) and the observed (presumably without consciousness), and hence the problem of causality. Although observership is not necessarily restricted to the human case, it is unclear where it begins and ends, and thus what can qualify as an observer. The implication is actually that the entire observing apparatus (and the cat) exists in quantum uncertainty until the act of observation. Thus living organisms (presumably including humans) can in one instance be causal observers (with consciousness) and in another instance objects (without consciousness) whose state is determined by external observation. Hence, not only are we admitting to not being able to determine where consciousness exists, we are assuming by the way this thought problem is framed, that consciousness can exist or not exist for the same entity, depending on its role in the experiment. A consistent approach to observership-experience would seem more reasonable.
In fact, there is no basis for assuming that observership (and thus some form of consciousness) is restricted to humans, cats, or even living organisms. We have claims of consciousness only from human observers, but there is anecdotal evidence for non-human species, and hard evidence of something akin to psychological phenomena from sub-atomic particles and Bose-Einstein condensates. We could just as easily (and incorrectly) assume that only physicists are capable of observership, because to date only physicists have observed quantum states. Also, this problem is usually framed in a way that ignores a basic principle of quantum mechanics; that quantum phenomena are exhibited only in systems with low quantum numbers, such as sub-atomic particles (or "wavicles"), or in correlated quantum matter that behaves like a single particle. Macroscopic systems (large quantum numbers) that are not specially constructed to preserve quantum behavior exhibit classical phenomena. Thus the measurement problem seems to also be related to scale, and one could argue that the macroscopic classical system has already been observed (or "objectively reduced" in the terms used by Hammeroff and Penrose) by virtue of its interrelationships. Also, due to continuing system interactions, it should remain in a state defined by that system of interactions indefinitely.
These two arguments lead to a possible resolution of the paradox. Once the observing apparatus is included in the experiment, there is a mixture of classical and non-classical systems. Classical systems (high number of non-correlated quantum particles) do not exhibit quantum phenomena, hence the observing apparatus and the cat (which are macroscopically defined) are in a knowable state throughout the experiment, and are responding to events in an entirely classical way (even though one may assume that their sub-atomic makeup retains uncertainty). Instruments that are not consciously observed can and do record seemingly random particle events (regardless of how a record is defined). I thus conclude that all observed properties exist only as macroscopic phenomena in relation to other particles of a system. In effect, what we actually observe are relationships which appear to us as classical objects or events. The act of observing through some form of particle interaction is in fact defining and participating in a system of interacting particles, and the observed state is thus a system property, that is, a property of systems with quantum numbers greater than one, such as particle tracks, recording instruments, cats, people, etc. As we isolate particles experimentally, then involve them in different systems (observations) we infer their non-system properties. The physical measurement cannot observe a quantum object at all, which thus remains outside of our world, but it can involve it in a system interaction within which it's role becomes defined as part of that system. The actual "observed" state is inseparable from its macroscopic and classical observing system because it is strictly a property of that system.
At the most fundamental level it is thus likely that fixed states of matter and energy do not exist at all except as a set of potential relationships, and that classical properties are emergent only in relation to system properties. It is perhaps the act of particle interaction (perhaps appearing like "self-collapse" of the quantum wave function, as proposed by Hammeroff and Penrose) that in essence "observes" the state, and every particle itself is an observer, albeit a rather unsophisticated one. This also implies that every particle is, in some strange sense, alive.
If physicists perform experiments on a particle in isolation, they infer its quantum behavior from the randomly normal distribution of results, but if they observe many interacting particles (as in a macroscopic object), they see more defined (limited) emergent system properties, exhibiting classical phenomena as the number of particles included in the system increases. The individual (classical) states of the system's particles are thus defined by their interactions, and do not exist in isolation. Hence, each particle carries with it the ability to interact with and thus co-define the state of other particles as an emergent system property, and they do so whether or not a researcher is present. Any macroscopic object, has in essence, observed itself through its own system interactions. If, however, a researcher is a part of this system, as we are a part of the space-time world, then he or she must observe the classical properties of that system. The EPR and delayed choice experiments did not involve macroscopic quantum uncertainty, which the cat paradox incorrectly assumes for the observing apparatus. In fact, such macroscopic quantum behavior has been observed only in highly specialized systems, such as a Bose-Einstein condensate, which is constructed of quantum correlated matter (many particles acting as one).
These ideas come closest to the thoughts of David Bohem. For example, compare the ideas above with a quote from Bohem's 1951 book, Quantum Theory (reprinted in 1989 by Dover):
"For as we have seen, the quantum properties of matter are to be associated with incompletely defined potentialities, which can be more definitely realized only in interaction with a classically describable system (a special case of which is a measuring apparatus)" Bohm, 1951
The resolution of this thought problem may be seen in this viewpoint: that if one did construct the diabolical apparatus to kill a cat when a particle decay is detected, then the apparatus itself would be involving the particle in its classical reality, which would decay at a specific (though unpredictable) time in the reference system of the observing apparatus and trigger the fatal mechanism. If, independently of this apparatus, one were to measure the quantum state of the particle (isolated experimentally), it would exhibit the individual quantum uncertainty properties (and emergent classical properties upon observation) appropriate to that observing system. This means that there is an objective reality (from our perspective), but that it exists only as an emergent property of macroscopic systems that are quantum uncorrelated and it is relative to those defining (or observing) systems. The entire macroscopic universe may be thought of as the observing system that presently defines our experiential and classical space-time reality, and thus ensures consistency of that experience. The fundamental (undefined) nature of our world is observed only by isolating parts of it under carefully controlled conditions - laboratory experiments and certain natural structures. Quantum correlated systems (single particles, Bose-Einstein condensates, and perhaps the perceptual apparatus of living organisms) retain the indeterminism of the underlying quantum reality, and thus exhibit observership phenomena. This then, may also be the essence of life (as experience), its rudiments existing in sub-atomic matter.
This perspective also says something about the nature of observership. The Copenhagen interpretation adopted a model where there is an apparent "collapse" of the quantum wave function on observation, but this may be only the way it appears to a classical observer. The "object" before observation may not really be changing state at all, so much as it is manifesting a classical role as an emergent system property by participating in a system interaction. The nature of the isolated "wavicle" remains quantum mechanical (as can be inferred from observation in reference to other macroscopic observing systems, within an experimental design that is constructed to emphasize system independence), yet by causing the wavicle to interact with and join a given system, we evoke macroscopic system properties that can be precisely noted. If classical system properties emerge in any system interaction, can we not assume that all matter is capable of observership?
An uncomfortable aspect of this view is the question of how particles can retain non-local relationships to other particles (in theory, all other particles), and yet be involved in apparently isolated observations under laboratory conditions. Again, however, the state of the given particle may not really be changing, but may instead be relative to the system (observation) that it is a part of - which is defined by the experimental design. The result that it may exhibit different emergent properties in relationship to different systems (when carefully designed to emphasize their observational independence, or sufficient separation in time) simply reinforces the conclusion that the actual sub-atomic state remains as unrestricted potential. Its apparent collapse, which endures for a predictable time and is stable under presumably independent observation, is a sort of hysteresis in the classical realm - a memory of the classical role that was evoked by the observation, lasting for the time required for that highly simplified system to be "forgotten." Is it possible that in addition to a basis for consciousness, this indicates a rudimentary basis for some aspect of memory? As a possible test of this view, one might ask if two independent systems could be created that would observe different properties at the same time from the same quantum object. This would show that the quantum object itself retains its undefined potential, but that the echo or memory of its state is a system-dependent property. The recent laboratory demonstration of dual simultaneous states of a single ion, may confirm this result, as the cleaver system arrangement used to produce this dual state may in effect be thought of as such a split system making dual simultaneous but independent observations, and thus manifesting dual emergent properties of the same undefined quantum object.
In other words, rather than the particle changing state on observation (as assumed in the Copenhagen Interpretation), it is the observing system that becomes defined along with apparent non-local correlations consistent with the defining observations. This differs dramatically from the "many worlds" view (discussed elsewhere) in that here, multiple worlds exist only as isolated and limited circumstances within our observable classical world, as defined by specialized observing systems.
The prediction, then, is that Schrodinger's cat will have a normal life without the least bit of confusion as to if it is alive or dead (but some confusion about its purpose, if autevolution is correct), but that if it does yet die from some raving physicist's experiment, it will do so at a precise time and could just as well be alone as under observation. Meanwhile, however, Schrodinger's cat has observed a lot of physicists, who's observed states are now irrevocably intertwined with one cat's state of mind, and if it does live, we may wish to correct any misconceptions it may have about our motives.
To argue for the a methodical (and to some, slower) development is to claim that understanding can be reached from virtually any direction, given the appropriate developments, but that it is generally best to start from where we are. This involves the greatest number of people and utilizes the foundations already provided, at great prior effort. My basic conclusion about strong Gaia, as identified in the conference, and hence autevolution as identified in this edition of the paper, is that if formulated on the basis of holism (as Lovelock originally described it) it may remain metaphorical and phenomenalistic, and thus easily ignored by many branches of science. However, if formulated on the basis of a slight modification to present theory - the recognition of a confirmed process and the mapping of the effects of that process in various disciplines - then advances will be more tangible and compelling. They may also have more practical application in science because correspondences can be more easily established with theories of known predictive value.
An anticipated criticism of this work from the more popularly progressive side, is that it suffers from being "reductionistic," that is, it proposes to explain life in terms of physical principles, which some people fear will devalue or trivialize the mysteries of human experience (e.g., art, love, mystical experience, etc.). The opposite criticism, from traditional scientific views, is that it is not reductionistic, but vitalistic. These criticisms tell us more about problems with categorization in the English language (philosophy's shifting definitions) than any important distinction, for neither of these categories fit. Perhaps it is because of my early training in physics that I do not see reductionism as a problem. Consider that in this case reductionism means reducing explanations to a fundamental uncertainty that has led scientists to seriously consider ontic limits to the knowable universe, and perhaps a "real" universe that extends beyond classical dimensions. With this hardly limiting "reduction" to beyond the dimensions of our knowable reality, I am confident that there will remain ample room for the mysteries of life. Meanwhile, reduction to familiar concepts, even ones we don't fully understand, should hardly be considered a flaw. Its purpose is to help organize and compare our understanding of our experiences.
Autevolution incorporates a indeterminate and seemingly vitalistic element (creative awareness) into current deterministic models (as does quantum theory), accepting their confirmed mechanical processes. The anticipated criticism that autevolution is "pre-scientific vitalism" or returns to mystical concepts of autogenesis (form created entirely from within), would be incorrect in one important regard, that autevolution, as described here, is fully consistent with classical theory. True vitalism and autogenisis would be inconsistent with current views because they are based entirely on vital assumptions that are alternatives to more successful models for observed phenomena. Returning to historical views might indeed ignore the hard won conclusions of classical and quantum physics, as well as other disciplines, and those conclusions would have to be reached again from a different starting point with perhaps equal if not greater effort. Still, the result would certainly be the same. Scientists have identified and adequately explained many apparently mechanical processes, and along the way have discovered the limits to this apparently mechanical nature. It is outside established limits to mechanical explanation that seemingly vital causes appear -- they do not appear as an entirely alternative explanation. Quantifying indeterminism within a basically mechanical worldview is not a vitalist worldview because it is formulated as an observable limit to deterministic processes, i.e., within an otherwise classical worldview. It would be more correct to refer to autevolution as representative of an organic worldview, as described by Abram (1991). Non-deterministic cause, where they are inescapable, can be presented in carefully prescribed forms (e.g., "the uncertainty principle"), the effects of which can be confirmed empirically. Vitalism, on the other hand, would attempt to see everything as original creation on a moment to moment basis, thus ignoring the common perception of time, space, and the corresponding processes we observe. Note, however, that a completely timeless perspective is not necessarily wrong (it also appears as a singularity in theories of cosmological origins), but it is not a view that entirely presents itself to us in our normal perceptual mode.
As a related comment on the source and role of art, a concern in evaluating the proposed creative origins within an inclusive worldview; there would seem to be ample opening for artistic origins and considerable effect of artistic expression. In fact the theory might suggest that there is considerably more room for such expression than is commonly perceived. First, one can argue that all art embodies uncertainty of some kind, which is one element that makes it interesting. Art poses questions for the beholder or listener more than it gives answers, and it seems that the best art raises the unanswerable questions, or the deepest experiences, to a high level of contemplation. In the evolutionary view proposed here, the emergence of art, and its creative content, is not as surprising as it might be with purely mechanical theories. Such artistic uncertainty and questioning is equivalent in concept to the idea of fundamental uncertainty (through observer-participancy) and self-determined function. These are, in the view presented here, the underlying cause of purposeful evolutionary directions (of form and ideas) about which much art is concerned. In the deterministic view, any system that would evolve an elaborate role for art would most logically have a practical use for it (otherwise why would natural selection have favored it?). Whereas, in the view presented here, its significant emergence would be expected even if only as an expression of one's own basic nature and creative origin. This may result from an increasing self-awareness (which must then include an increasing awareness of uncertainty). It is thus not surprising that other complex organisms, such as the great apes, also exhibit interest in artistic expression. Such expressions, rather than being the result of evolution would instead be more significant as a cause of future evolutionary directions.
The fact that parallels can be drawn with human experience, such as art, should be seen as strengthening to the basic worldview because it suggests a more parsimonious unity within the sciences as well as between science and other forms of living experience or expression. Furthermore, an established worldview where art and science embrace each other more fully would have tremendous social value, a factor given some importance in science by philosophers such as Kuhn, in his analysis of scientific revolutions.
Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. "Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution." Boulder: Bear Mountain
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