It was suggested during the Chapman conference that the Gaia hypothesis can only be taken seriously as a metaphor. For example, one version of the Gaia Hypotheses (Lovelock, 1979) states metaphorically that: "The entire range of living matter on Earth, from whales to viruses, from oaks to algae, could be regarded as constituting a single living entity, capable of manipulating the Earth's atmosphere to suit its overall needs and endowed with faculties and powers far beyond those of its constituent parts."
The problem with a metaphor is that, at most, it describes phenomena: It thus cannot be used to construct theory, but does often inspire its construction. Lovelock's statement is not a scientific hypothesis, but rather a metaphorical description of phenomena, and it is not prescriptive in that form. On the other hand, it should be no more bothersome than Darwin's references to "struggle for survival;" which he himself called metaphor, but then continued to employ in describing his theory (Todes, 1989; and Richards, 1987). The ability of each of these metaphors to produce popular misconceptions has been similar, and perhaps their ability to stimulate genuine scientific thought may not be so different either.
First, we must recognize that all theories are based on founding assumptions, often metaphysical, that are not themselves subject to experimental confirmation. Such foundations often involve circular (i.e. tautological) definitions and arbitrary views of nature that provide the starting point and structure for theory. For example, the Euclidean geometry assumed by Newton was consistent with all tests at the time and was therefore accepted as an accurate model. The fact that it was eventually found to be inaccurate on relativistic scales does not damage Newtonian theory itself, but rather establishes the limits of its worldview. Such definitions and underlying assumptions represent the way we choose to perceive reality, i.e. from what perspective (paradigm or worldview) we will develop theories, all of which are limited and many of which have taken dramatic turns historically. The value of theory thus cannot be judged on the testability of its foundations (assumptions and definitions), but rather on its performance as a structure for productive scientific thought (fruitfulness). It is, in contrast, individual processes or mechanisms proposed within theory that can be tested empirically. This distinction between assumptions and causal processes of theory is critical to evaluating new concepts such as implied by strong forms of Gaia.
Second, a non-metaphorical theory underlying strong forms of Gaia must involve explanations in terms of both ecological and evolutionary processes. Evolution is as fundamental to the way we see the universe as are space and time. As Peter Medawar was quoted as saying regarding creationism, "for a biologist, the alternative to thinking in evolutionary terms is not to think at all" (Little, 1980). In other words, if we hypothesize novel emergent properties of living systems, we must be able to explain how they might have come about, perhaps using new theory, but without contradicting known processes. This is true for Lovelock's obviously metaphorical and phenomenalistic description of a self-organizing Gaia, just as it was for the Darwinian (metaphorical and phenomenalistic) struggle for survival. Current models of evolution incorporate many confirmed causal processes (such as genetic variation and expression, heritability, differential survival), but are also composed of definitions (such as for life and fitness) and starting assumptions (such as genetic novelty and the role of environmental selection). It is the limitations of these definitions and assumptions that new theory must rigorously explore, and if current theory cannot explain observable Gaian phenomena, it may be as reasonable to examine our theoretical assumptions about life and evolution as it is to challenge such enigmatic observations.
Physics envy
Theory development
Platonic realism
It is apparent that any strong basis for Gaia theory emerging from such efforts must be truly interdisciplinary, and thus will require a commonly accepted epistemology. It is likely that a unified view of living systems will require both new scientific perspectives and epistemological synthesis to fully accommodate interdisciplinary issues (Roederer, 1985; Goldberg, 1989). Yet there has been little work on interdisciplinary synthesis, and even our models of science tend to be divided along disciplinary lines, perhaps most sharply between the physical and biological sciences, but also within biological disciplines. This engages two philosophical debates that have been active during the past quarter century; one concerning the applicability of scientific methods across disciplines (particularly the applicability of the methods of physics to the fields of evolution and ecology), and the other concerning the relative merits of instrumentalism versus realism (see section on epistemology). A brief history illustrates the problem.
Physics envy was especially common among biologists in the early 60's. This was epitomized by an article calling for the use of "strong inference" (Platt, 1964), which emphasized the tradition of testing and exclusion of "multiple alternative hypotheses" (after the traditions of Bacon, Popper, Chamberlin, etc.), citing this as "a surer method to produce more rapid results." A greater emphasis on this Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) methodology, or strong inference (the same process emphasized by Kirchner, 1991), did indeed take place but with less robust theoretical results than in physics. This prompted Paine (1977), for example, to translate Platt's appeal for hard science into an appeal for greater emphasis on experimental approaches in building theory, and less reliance on theoretical dogma -- particularly the "dogmatic predictions of steady-state competition theory." While the experimental ecologists have apparently fared well with the method, disenchantment seems to surround the development of theory. Simberloff (1981) perhaps symbolized this exasperation by suggesting (somewhat facetiously) that only the results of field or lab experiments should be recognized as "valid contributions" to the scientific literature. In contrast to blaming the ecologists, Hall (1985), for example, asserted that Platt's strong inference may be inapplicable to ecology due to the many "system-dependent results" and the "multi-factorial world of ecology." Another claim defensively asserts that physics is in trouble, having advanced rapidly to the point where, as Niels Bohr (1961) declared in 1929, it is impossible to uphold the concept of a purely objective reality. Others (e.g., Thompson, 1989) have used this development in physics to justify the pursuit of instrumentalist methods in evolution theory and theoretical ecology.
Regardless of where we attempt to point the finger, the concern in developing theoretical ecology and linking it with evolution theory seems to have been over an apparent lack of vitality in theory development and the lack of correspondence between these and other disciplines. This created a situation described by Ehrlich (1988), in which ecological theory cannot be based on physical or even universal laws, because each ecological system seems unique. This condition should raise serious concern. For one thing, it is hard to accept that physics has not had to deal with similar epistemological problems, yet its tradition o seeking consistent and universal theory has resulted in great advances. Perhaps more to the point, and where Hall (1985) is probably right, is that we do not understand all of the epistemological processes that have, in some areas of physics, succeeded in integrating theory and eliminating theoretical system dependencies.
Instrumental theories (which are accorded meaning by virtue of their behavior in relation to nature, as opposed to being based on supposedly "real" quantities or principles, such as mass, force, etc.) by their design tend to develop as distinct paradigms. This can result in diverse theories and models that are "incommensurable" (i.e., they cannot be merged). However, it is important to remember that instrumentalism emerged in physics not because of the failure of attempts to describe nature in real terms, but because of the limits of perception itself. In fact it was a form of Platonic realism (strictly speaking, the notion of a primary unitary reality that scientific theory attempts to describe and predict, but which may never be fully known) that allowed physics to discover the limits of classical reality. Faced with the situation that beyond this point concepts of "real" in the classical sense necessarily became blurred, it then became a philosophical question whether or not the constructs of theory in the quantum world could be called "real" at all. In regard to ecological and evolutionary theories, however, we have yet to consider seriously nonclassical views, having not defined the limits to the concept of a single classical reality in mainstream biological science.
Thus, it is not surprising that an emphasis on H-D methodology (or strong inference) in ecology has worked well for experimentalists and not so well for theoreticians. The vitality of theory development that has characterized physics is not primarily attributable to H-D methods, but to rigorously questioning the basis of theory through attempts to understand the nature of reality (i.e., what I refer to simply as realism), a process that can challenge one's basic perspective and lead necessary transitions to new assumptions. Ecology, on the other hand, seems to be abandoning the concept of an underlying reality, which prevents it from making important transitions. Correspondingly, there is little effort in ecology and evolution to integrate theories or combine their assumptions (as was characteristic in the realism of physicists), even for classical mechanistic models. Meanwhile, the instrumentalist view that ecology seems to be welcoming quickly, has not been fully accepted even in quantum physics, which may instead be leaning toward a "scientific quantum realism" that maintains the pursuit of a parsimonious reality (Rohrlich and Hardin, 1983; Rohrlich, 1989). A truly interdisciplinary science cannot develop if we pursue epistemologies that cannot be integrated among theories and disciplines.
Perhaps, then, the problem of vagueness attributed to Gaia, and other theories involving life as a causal agent results from trying to force them into current biological theory, which lends little mechanistic support, has numerous controversies of its own, and has adopted an epistemology that avoids challenging basic assumptions or exploring new ones. In the next section, I attempt to define a strong basis for Gaia theory in terms of autevolution and identify worldview assumptions that must be considered.
Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. "Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution." Boulder: Bear Mountain
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