Ideas of interconnectedness and harmony in nature has existed since early recorded times (Visvader, 1991). Such ideas are represented today in the concept of Gaia (Abram, 1985 and 1991). Like the historical views, many modern notions of Gaia have been only metaphorically or phenomenalistically defined, and are therefore difficult to analyze scientifically (Kirchner, 1991). Yet some of the difficulty may also stem from narrow interpretations of the nature of science and overly simplistic assumptions in biological theory (Goldsmith, 1990). This situation has motivated intense debate but few attempts to integrate differing theoretical perspectives that are inseparably linked to our basic view of life.
Two forms of James Lovelock's "Gaia hypothesis" were identified during the Chapman conference. These were termed weak Gaia and strong Gaia, at the conference referring to the degree of supposed influence of biota on the environment, at microscopic to global levels. The degree of influence that has been variously proposed has included, on the one hand, the influential, stabilizing, and coevolutionary taxonomies proposed by Kirchner (1991); and on the other hand, various superorganism concepts, which include teleological or even conscious control on the part of the biota as a whole. For greater generality and greater clarity with regard to the epistemological issues that may be called into question, I suggest replacing the "weak Gaia" vs. "strong Gaia" nomenclature of the original Chapman conference with the labels "ecological Gaia" and "evolutionary Gaia" respectively. This reflects what I believe is an important philosophical split within the biological sciences.
I define ecological Gaia as a class of theories that attempt to explain global and interactive systems phenomena in terms of present ecological concepts (including cooperation and control theory). It is thus bound by current theoretical structures including adaptation and mechanistic evolution, and is confined to current scientific assumptions and definitions of life. The main epistemological concern for this class of hypotheses is testability within established scientific disciplines and within the traditional empirical methods of science. Ecological Gaia theories would thus be judged in regard to how well they conform to observations within current paradigms and concepts of science. Examples in this category might be the hypothesis that land cover tends to have a regulating effect on global climate (e.g. Lovelock's "Daisyworld" model), or that atmospheric compositions have co-evolved with life. Certainly, the initial steps toward a "science of the Earth" are beginning in this manner (e.g. Rambler, et al., 1989).
However, implied (or stated) in the Gaia views that have emerged, there is a pervasive concept that is not part of the way traditional science has been formalized, or the way traditional biology has been formalized; one in which life itself is seen as a causal agent both in ecology and evolution (see Lovelock, 1979, 1988; Margulis and Lovelock, 1989; Jantsch, 1980; Plotkin, 1988; Wheeler, 1981; Wigner, 1981; Bohr, 1958, 1961, 1963; Odling-Smee, 1988). The stronger form of Gaia, or "evolutionary Gaia" refers to such interpretations of Gaia that require modification to existing theoretical assumptions about nature, necessarily involving the modern "synthetic theory" of evolution (and perhaps challenges some limited ideas about science). For example, a literal concept of a superorganism would probably fall into this category because it violates traditional ways of defining life in reproductive terms and suggests consciousness at a system level. A strictly theological approach to Gaia may also fall into this category, but is not considered here because it rejects science as a method of discovery. Thus, it is not the degree of biotic influence or specific phenomena that distinguishes a stronger, evolutionary Gaia theory from more acceptable ecological treatments, but rather the kind and origin of influence that is assumed.
Accepting this distinction between the two forms of Gaia, the focus of this paper is on possibilities within the second category, that is, on epistemologically acceptable interpretations of evolutionary Gaia that may nevertheless challenge current theoretical assumptions. I argue that this class of Gaia theory represents a worldview that deals with life as a causally effective creative process, both in ecology and evolution, that is, where organisms are seen as participating in their evolution. In this paper I describe such an evolutionary basis for Gaia, which I call autevolution, literally, "self evolution," meaning evolution of the "self" and the role of the "self" in evolution.
No complete theory evolutionary Gaia (or autevolution) currently exists in scientific terms, although a number of serious efforts are evidently being developed. In this paper I try to uncover the roots for a suitable theory in terms of fundamental principles. This necessarily exposes critical epistemological issues for which we must establish guidelines for evaluation. After a brief background discussion, I address the problem in three stages. First, I propose a modification to our evolutionary worldview to include creative processes. Second, I develop an epistemological model that shows how various philosophies of science can be integrated to provide a means by which these theoretical views can be evaluated. This is necessary to bridge current boundaries between ecology, evolution, and physics. Finally, I discuss some likely implications of an autevolution theory, its epistemology, and the relationship between the implied worldview and more traditional ideas, including the mechanistic view of evolution.
Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. "Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution." Boulder: Bear Mountain
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