I could find no previous use of the term "autevolution" in the literature or in common English (although the search was certainly incomplete) and hence am attempting to define it here. "Aut" means "self," as in autecology which deals with interactions between an organism and its environment. Thus autevolution would mean, literally, "self evolution." Because this is defined as a holistic phenomena it has two aspects: evolution of the experiential or perceptual "self," and the role of this "self" in affecting the course of evolution. As with other theories, there are two levels: (a) the level of the worldview, which can be evaluated for its reasonableness and usefulness but cannot be assailed on logical grounds; and (2) consequent theory, which must propose causal processes by which it is supposed to operate. Autevolution is discussed on both levels in this paper. (use browser back arrow to return to text)
Complementary views are views (or theories) which are each necessary for a complete description of a system or phenomena, but that cannot be combined (for example inspecting the weave of a Persian rug versus evaluating the artistry of its pattern - Rohrlich, 1989). Such inability to obtain all the information simultaneously is epistemic uncertainty. In the case of complementarity in quantum physics, not only is it impossible to integrate the different views (e.g. elementary particle states), but choosing one view actually allows the state of the other to change, because of the uncertainty principle. This is ontic uncertainty, a property of nature (as best we know). (use browser back arrow to return to text)
Note, however, that both Bohr and Wheeler avoid using the term consciousness because of its human connotations, preferring the term registration for the most rudimentary observation event. Bohr also referred to the psyche in this context, which he argued must, in its most basic nature, be a part of all living forms, and have its basis in inanimate nature. He thus saw living systems as magnifying this registration ability, which is already evident in inanimate matter, although in seemingly random events. (use browser back arrow to return to text)
Consistency means lack of conflict given the scope of the concepts being compared, not necessarily that one theory is derivable from another, as in strict correspondence, even though derivability is the most powerful demonstration of consistency. The fact that Newtonian dynamics and Cartesian geometry represent a special, derivable case of the theory of relativity was a very satisfying result. Nevertheless, mathematical consistency or correspondence may be difficult or impossible to demonstrate, as Niels Bohr discovered in his attempt to express quantum theory in classical terms. It is not the mathematics that must be treated consistently between theories (or world views), but rather the predictions of theory or specific phenomena that have been experimentally verified. (use browser back arrow to return to text)
Many branches of science use the term mechanism to refer to the inner workings or processes proposed by theory, disregarding the term's restrictive mechanical, materialistic, or deterministic connotations (a distinction that is unnecessary in fields that study only classical phenomena). To avoid confusion, the term process or causal process is used here except when classical mechanism is the intended meaning. (use browser back arrow to return to text)
Usage of the term paradigm tends to vary, but here refers to the set of operating assumptions for a given thought exercise at any level. The term world view refers to the grand paradigm for a scientific theory or discipline. At still another level, one can speak of the paradigm of science, which has to do with science methodology, or epistemology (the subject of this paper). (use browser back arrow to return to text)
It is neither feasible nor appropriate here to attempt a review of the literature on the philosophy of science. Donovan, et al. (1988) have provided a current review of the field, and Rohrlich (1989) provided a simplified account of the central idea presented here (paradox). Most of what is presented recognizes the philosophies of Popper (1959 and 1965) and Kuhn (1970). Except for retaining a place for traditional H-D methodology, the model presented should be compatible with Suppe's (1977) account of "historical realism," which provides a balance of philosophical views. The model presented attempts to integrate these philosophies to represent some major characteristics, but of course cannot capture the full intricacy of scientific progress. (use browser back arrow to return to text)
Many philosophers today claim that rigorously positivistic models do not reflect what really takes place in most disciplines. Elements of positivism are retained here as an idealized process, operating within definable limits (i.e., the worldview). Even as a theoretical process, its manifestation in practice may be obscured by other factors, such as the linkage with observational analysis that is depicted in the diagram. (use browser back arrow to return to text)
Analogies between physics and the mind have had a profound effect on modern thinking, which indirectly shapes our scientific, technological, and cultural paradigms. The reader may note Capra (1975) and a whole genre of other popular books. (use browser back arrow to return to text)
In Bohr's words the quantum postulate states that "the finite magnitude of the quantum of action prevents altogether a sharp distinction being made between a phenomenon and the agency by which it is observed" (Bohr, 1958). Or, as Wheeler puts it: "No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered (i.e. observed) phenomenon....We are all inescapably involved in bringing about that which appears to be happening" (Wheeler, 1981).(use browser back arrow to return to text)
The question of what is "real" has no unequivocal answer. The trend (Suppe, 1977) has been to define "real" as our present concept of reality, our belief in that concept, having evidence for it, our belief in our evidence, etc. (sometimes called the "K-K thesis"). Implicit in this philosophy is that there is, in fact, something to know, i.e. an ultimate reality that theory approximates. The term realism as used here is thus somewhat relative to current beliefs, although the important point is that it seeks to base theory on real constructs. (use browser back arrow to return to text)
Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. "Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution." Boulder: Bear Mountain
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