Kineman, J. 1997. Theory of Autevolution

The basis for autevolution

Life as an organizing causal process

The basic assumption
Analogy with physics
The problem of disciplinary compartmentalization

In this section I investigate possible foundations for a theory of autevolution in existing principles, particularly in quantum physics. To do this, it is necessary to consider the basic assumptions and underlying metaphysics of the overall paradigm.

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The basic assumption

It is clear from a close examination of philosophies of science and epistemology that evolutionary (strong) Gaia must be defined as a worldview (within which specific mechanistic theories may then be possible). This does not presume to usurp the task from researchers active in developing Gaian theories. It does, however, undertake to isolate fundamental principles as characteristics of these attempts in general.

While Gaia may be most often described phenomenalistically and metaphorically, we may still be able to infer both new assumptions and useful hypotheses from these descriptions, as did the neo-Darwinists in defining natural selection and the mechanism of inheritance from more general concepts of evolution. Strong forms of Gaia involve a view of life as a creative and active agent. From this beginning alone it must be challenging to current theory; but it must itself be challenged to propose an acceptable modification to present assumptions and a viable process for its operation, i.e., to allow theory development and confirmation.

What seems most characteristic about strong versions of Gaia is the notion of an emergent property of living systems, not predicted by current theory, whereby an ecosystem, or the biosphere as a whole, may seem to act in a coordinated manner and tend to maintain itself through its effect on resources. Our current theories, including coevolution, do not easily extend such organismic behavior to the system level, where evolution cannot proceed by the same means as for reproductive organisms. The mechanism for deriving large-scale organization from currently known processes is problematic, mostly because of present assumptions about life, and the limitations of theory mentioned earlier. Traditional theory treats biological organization as an epiphenomenon, that is, a result of other causal processes, but concepts of Gaia unanimously describe life itself as an organizing causal process.

The Gaian view (described in terms of phenomena) implies a general principle that life is fundamentally self-organizing; and, in the strongest sense, that life is fundamentally self-determining (Jantsch, 1980). It also implies that living structures have the ability to manifest this property to various degrees, at various levels of biological organization. (That the process is exhibited significantly on a planetary scale would then be a subsidiary hypothesis.) Many examples of organization, self regulation, and environmental manipulation clearly exist in the weak sense (i.e., treated by current theory as epiphenomena), but as a theoretical construct the idea implies a radically new principle in the definition of life. Furthermore, this must be considered in an evolutionary perspective, since evolution is fundamental to our understanding of living forms. This is a big step that will be hard for many theoreticians to accept unless the proposed principle can be based on causal processes that are consistent with our most fundamental concepts of reality and natural law.


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Analogy with physics

Ironically, at the most fundamental level of physics, there is a direct analogy and possible basis for such principles, which we shall refer to as autevolution, in terms of the "quantum postulate" of Niels Bohr (Bohr, 1958, 1961, 1963). This postulate introduced a worldview in which a newly discovered property of nature, which seems to be related to life, may be the primary causative agent in determining physical conditions at the quantum level. Wheeler (1981) summarized, writing that:

"useful as it is under everyday circumstances to say that the world exists 'out there' independent of us, that view can no longer be upheld. There is a strange sense in which this is a 'participatory universe.'"

This phenomenon has been termed observer-participancy, which we may interpret as a fundamental decision event.

While the findings of elementary particle physics have completely changed the way we view the universe, classical descriptions of nature are unchallenged at material levels significantly larger than the "quantum of action" (systems with large quantum numbers). Yet the manifestation of quantum phenomena is not restricted to the scale of elementary particles, as is most often assumed. Bohr wrote extensively on the implications for life and "analogies with some fundamental features of the quantum theory exhibited by the laws of psychology," particularly the "difficulty of distinguishing between subject and object." As with others who followed, Bohr thought that "free will" might be linked with quantum uncertainty and that the connection might go beyond analogy:

"Yet it may well be that behind these analogies there lies not only a kinship with regard to the epistemological aspects, but [also] that a more profound relationship is hidden behind the fundamental biological problems which are connected to both sides ... there is much which indicates that we are concerned here with questions which closely approach the circle of ideas of the quantum theory" (Bohr, 1961).

Wigner (1981) wrote:

"a being with consciousness must have a different role in quantum mechanics than the inanimate measuring device" ... "it will remain remarkable ... that the very study of the external world led to the conclusion that the content of the consciousness is an ultimate reality".

The discussion did not end with psychology, however. Bohr was of the opinion that "some amplifying mechanism" exists in living organisms that magnifies the effects of quantum processes, noting that the human brain and sensory system is developed "to the utmost limit permitted by physics." He wrote that:

"Indeed, the essential characteristics of living beings must be sought in a peculiar organization in which features that may be analyzed by usual mechanics are interwoven with typically atomistic features to an extent unparalleled in inanimate matter" (Bohr, 1958).

There has since been confirmation that sensory receptor cells, in a variety of sensory systems and in a wide range of organisms, operate as quantum mechanical amplifiers by maintaining a quantum "non-equilibrium state" (Bialek and Schweitzer, 1985). This supports Bohr's amplification hypothesis, wherein life forms are capable of retaining sensitivity to quantum indeterminism. Wheeler asked:

"If the elementary quantum process is an act of creation, is an act of creation of any other kind required to bring into being all that is?" Wheeler (1981)

Within this view, it would not be a great leap to suggest, as did Bohr, that the phenomena of observer-participancy may be amplified and expressed to various degrees within all living organisms. An acceptable explanation of how such phenomena can become manifest in macroscopic (e.g., organismic) systems through evolution would seem to involve, as a minimum, a combination of the currently accepted elements of evolution theory (e.g., heredity, variation, and natural selection) with cumulative effects of observer-participancy.

This approach has been considered in the study of "dissipative structures," which seem to exhibit properties that can be expressed by "only a few quantum numbers" (Jantsch, 1980). From this view, the innovative, adaptive, and self-sustaining properties of organisms are almost axiomatic, and it becomes reasonable that living systems should exhibit self-regulation, self-organization, and various degrees of control over the environment, as a predictable result of non-equilibrium processes characteristic of living forms. Jantsch, in fact, does take the view that life is fundamentally "self-determining" and further suggests that the decision-making ability of non-equilibrium systems may be related to quantum indeterminacy, which dissipative structures are capable of magnifying into "macroscopic indeterminacy." He points out that such indeterminacy should not be confused with random uncertainty, and that it is fundamentally non-random and non-deterministic (thus agreeing with Bohr). The theory of dissipative structures seems to model many salient characteristics in the holistic nature of living systems (autopoiesis, self-reference, high malleability, system maintenance, etc.).


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The problem of disciplinary compartmentalization

Such theories suggest that there are grounds for serious consideration of a universal concept of life as a causal agent. Such views appear more to violate traditions of disciplinary compartmentalization than acceptable views of the nature of reality. Thus, while theories that are consistent with this worldview may be developing rapidly on their own, the reluctance to integrate them with current theories coupled with the lack of a commonly accepted epistemology, leaves no objective tools for evaluation. This lack of interdisciplinary synthesis or development of consistency between fields, including evolution and ecology, may forestall potentially important transitions in thought.

New approaches in holistic science inevitably deal with concepts of mind or psyche, an issue which post-Darwinian biology has traditionally tried to exclude from concepts of causation. The roots of this are mostly cultural and historical: One could argue that confusion between psychological and material theories has been so damaging to both, that it has been the more prudent course to keep them apart. For many reasons, however, such arbitrary separations are now crumbling (Roederer, 1985), and we must find the means for scientific integration, including an understanding of science as a process applying equally across disciplines, even if those disciplines cannot yet be integrated themselves. I therefore provide two sections on epistemology to provide a conceptual framework before proceeding with further discussion of the causal processes and implications of autevolution.


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Revised and reprinted from: Kineman, John Jay. 1991. "Gaia: hypothesis or worldview?" Paper delivered at the American Geophysical Union annual Chapman Conference, panel on epistemology, March, 1988, San Diego, California. Chapter 7 In: Schneider, S. H., and P. J. Boston (eds). 1991. Scientists on Gaia. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 433p.

Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. "Toward a special and general theory of autevolution." Boulder: Bear Mountain Institute. HTML publication on the World Wide Web.
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